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PERSONAL JURISDICTION
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CHARLES

CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSONt

ABSTRACT

In a sextet of recent decisions, the Roberts Court upended the longstanding
framework for general and specific contacts-based personal jurisdiction. The
Court's new approach has engendered uncertainty and erected insurmountable
obstacles for some plaintiffs in locating an effective forum to vindicate their
rights. We propose a novel solution to the injustices and unpredictability unleashed by these decisions: a new model corporate registration act that would
require, as a condition of doing business in a state, the corporation'sconsent to
personal jurisdiction in defined circumstances that implicate state sovereign
regulatory, protective, and prescriptive interests.
Registration-basedconsent to jurisdictionhas a long pedigree, dating back
to the years before the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. For much of its
history, however, registration-basedjurisdictional consent languished in obscurity, as general "doing business" jurisdiction overshadowed the doctrine. With
the Supreme Court's recent "at-home" trilogy sounding the death knell of general "continuous and systematic" contacts jurisdiction, the constitutional propriety of interpreting a state corporate registration scheme to require the
corporation'sall-purposejurisdictionalconsent for claims arising anywhere in
the world is in doubt. Insteadof litigatingthe meaning and the ongoing validity
of these longstandingregistrationstatutes, we recommend that the states adopt a
modernized jurisdictional-consentstatute that ensures an appropriatestate jurisdictional reach and operates within the Supreme Court's pronounced adjudicative framework.
We draft and evaluate a proposalfor such a statute, which we believe the
Uniform Law Commission is especially well situated to consider, refine, and
promulgatefor the states' benefit. Such a statute would avoid the wasteful expense of litigating the interpretation of registration statutes initially adopted
during the heyday of the horse and buggy. More importantly, the proposed act
would allow the states to assert their sovereign authority to ensure access to
justice for their residents after the dismantling of general jurisdiction. By precisely tailoringthe statute to states' sovereign interests, the proposed act avoids
* Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes is Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law Houston. Our thanks to Michael Barry, Randall Kelso, and Jeffrey Rensberger for their comments
and insights on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Scott Dodson, Richard Freer, Thomas Main,
Ramona Lampley, Thomas Metzloff, Zoe Neisel, Jeffrey Parness, Philip Pucillo, D. Theodore
Rave, Linda Sandstrom Simard, A. Benjamin Spencer, Michael Vitiello, Howard Wasserman,
and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Civil Procedure Roundtable for thoughtful
conversation and support in developing this project.
tCassandra Burke Robertson is the John Deaver Drinko-BakerHostetler Professor of Law
and Director of the Center for Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of
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constitutionalpitfalls while still providing an effective jurisdictional reach for
the states after the Roberts Court's jurisdictionalrevolution.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court promised. The demise of "doing business" general
personal jurisdiction would not restrict plaintiffs' forum choice so severely
that "deep injustice" would result.' Instead, "flourish[ing]" conceptions of
specific jurisdiction would fill any voids and ensure that plaintiffs would still
have a convenient forum in which to seek relief.2 Perhaps the Court might
'Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133 n.10 (2014).
Id.

2
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still someday keep this promise by adopting a broad enough understanding
of specific jurisdiction to balance appropriately the interests of plaintiffs,
defendants, and sovereign states. 3 But that day is not yet here. Until (and
unless) that day arrives, uncertainty and injustice will continue to plague
jurisdictional doctrine.
From 2011 to 2017, the Supreme Court invalidated exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction in six separate cases.4 The decisions from 2017, BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,6
illustrate the resulting doctrinal upheaval. In both cases, bases for jurisdiction had been so well settled by consistent lower-court interpretations that
similarly situated multi-state corporate defendants previously often waived
any jurisdictional challenge.7 Now such defendants are not only raising such
challenges, but are prevailing-even without any indication that the plaintiffs' selected fora would cause any litigation-related inconveniences.
These decisions are particularly troubling because the Roberts Court
has not explained its view of what personal jurisdiction is. 9 The Court's offhand assurances regarding still-extant jurisdictional avenues, made in opinions that sharply restrict personal jurisdiction in previously routine contexts,
are impossible to evaluate when the Court has not provided its guidance on
the new jurisdictional tapestry. Instead, the Court has been snipping the supporting doctrinal strands, without indicating whether the remaining strands
will be strengthened, ignored, or discarded.10
3See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium in PersonalJurisdiction,48 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 207, 263-69 (2014) (proposing such a
framework).
4 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler, 571 U.S. 117;
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
5 137 S. Ct. 1773.
6 137 S. Ct. 1549.
' See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants' Terms: BristolMyers Squibb & the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1275
(2018) (recognizing that before 2011 Bristol-Myers did not have "a leg to stand on in contesting jurisdiction"); Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501,
503 (2015) (contending Supreme Court's recent decisions tightened general jurisdiction over
multi-state and multi-national corporations "to an extent that, until quite recently, would have
been unfathomable").
See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (emphasizing the defendant's burden from
"submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the
claims in question," but not identifying any litigation-related burdens suffered by Bristol-Myers); Bradt & Rave, supra note 7, at 1254 ("There was, of course, nothing inconvenient about
[Bristol-Myers] litigating in California."). Indeed, Bristol-Myers never argued that California
was an unduly inconvenient or burdensome forum for the litigation. See Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 892 (Cal. 2016), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
9See Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 1165, 1179 (2018) ("[T]he Supreme Court doesn't seem to have a clear consensus on
what its personal-jurisdiction doctrine is trying to do, or how it is supposed to do it.").
o Cf Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in PersonalJurisdiction,70 FLA. L.
REV. 499, 505 (2018) (asserting the Supreme Court has stealthily "implement[ed] radical law
reform" in personal jurisdiction without "constructing persuasive explanations" or principled

380

Harvard Journal on Legislation

[Vol. 57

This case-by-case repudiation of jurisdictional authority undercuts the
primary goals of the adjudicative system. By dismantling prevailing generaljurisdiction jurisprudence without resolving key issues that were certain to
arise in its absence, the Court crippled predictability." And the resulting
doctrinal instability significantly raises litigation costs, as previously settled
issues become ripe fodder for litigating new jurisdictional objections. 12 Nor
is the current jurisdictional scheme fair. 13 Unless the Court later expands the
contours of specific jurisdiction (which it has not done yet despite prior opportunities), the Court's approach will prevent some injured parties from
seeking effective relief, contradicting, as Professor Arthur Miller explained,
"the aspirations of the American civil justice system." 14
Yet these recent Roberts Court holdings focus only on the limits of
contacts-based adjudicative jurisdiction. Even as these cases narrow the
outer due-process limits of the minimum-contacts standard, they leave room
for the states to identify, assert, and enforce their interests in protecting state
residents and regulating in-state business activities through alternative jurisdictional means. We therefore propose that, instead of awaiting a potential
but uncertain judicial rebalancing or an unlikely federal legislative or rule
cure, state legislatures once again take the lead in ensuring appropriate adjudicative power for their courts, legislatively asserting their sovereign authority to resolve claims implicating state interests.15

&

constitutional grounding); Samuel P. Jordan, Hybrid Removal, 104 IOWA L. REV. 793, 794
(2019) (arguing a "personal jurisdiction revolution is underway").
" See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 3, at 230 (predicting future likely jurisdictional
disputes); cf Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business of
PersonalJurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 790-91 (2017) [hereinafter Robertson
Rhodes, Business] (discussing lower court cases addressing such issues); Cassandra Burke
Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction,
TransnationalLitigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 661
(2015) [hereinafter Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting Equilibrium] (discussing cases beginning to
raise the predicted issues).
12 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, PersonalJurisdictionin Legal MalpracticeLitigation,
6 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICs 2, 15 (2016) (noting that under "[t]he prior pervasiveness of the 'continuous and systematic' standard" many defendants "did not even challenge
jurisdiction").
13 See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23, 100 (2018) ("Limiting the general jurisdiction of domestic defendants
to just one or two states drastically changed the presumed access to courts that plaintiffs previously enjoyed against large companies with a hefty business presence in many or even all
states.").
14 Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 369
(2013).
15 The political climate in some states, of course, may not be conducive to such legislative
action. Nevertheless, a state-level approach provides the opportunity for state experimentation
and evades the political intransigence in Washington (both in legislating and rulemaking) that
may doom the insightful academic calls for beneficial statutory or rule changes at the federal
level. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Extending FederalRule of Civil Procedure4(k)(2): A Way
to (Partially)Clean Up the PersonalJurisdictionMess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413 (2017) [hereinafter Borchers, Extending]; Scott Dodson, PersonalJurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1 (2018); Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking
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During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, when the Supreme Court's prevailing territorial-sovereignty notions of jurisdictional authority under the common law became incompatible with interstate corporate
operations and interstate travel, the states did not wait for a judicial solution. 16 Rather, the states sought to expand their jurisdictional reach legislatively by requiring explicit or deeming implicit appointment of in-state
agents for service of process when nonresidents undertook defined activities
within the state.17 Service on the in-state agent within state territory provided
a means to authorize jurisdictional power over the nonresident while comporting with the then-prevailing sovereignty limitations on adjudicative authority." After the Supreme Court adopted a more realistic fairness
jurisdictional rationale in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,19 the states
began enacting so-called long-arm statutes to take advantage of the new
framework. 20 These statutes typically authorize the service of summons on a
nonresident defendant unless such an assertion of adjudicative authority
would violate due process of law. 21 But with the recent Roberts Court decisions rendering the meaning of the due-process limitations in flux, long-arm
statutes need supplementation to promote predictability and ensure an appropriate state jurisdictional reach.
We recommend that the Uniform Law Commission ("ULC") propose a
Model Act that would amend existing state corporate registration schemes to
require, as a condition of doing business in a state, the corporation's consent
to suit in defined circumstances that implicate state sovereign interests. For
example, the statute might permit jurisdiction when the suit arises from an
injury suffered in the state, the suit is brought by a state resident, the suit is
governed by that state's law, or the suit is to enforce a judgment or remedial
order against persons or property within the state. This explicit, definedconsent proposal differs from existing state registration statutes, almost all of
which do not specify the jurisdictional consequences, if any, of a corporation's in-state registration to do business. 22 Courts accordingly are sharply
FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713 (2015); Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1301 (2014); A.
Benjamin Spencer, The TerritorialReach of the FederalCourts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979 (2019).
16 See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Nineteenth Century PersonalJurisdictionDoctrine in

a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 392-95 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century].
" See id.

* See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (upholding implied-consent statute for nonresident motorists).

19 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

20 See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & STANLEY E. Cox, JURISDICTION IN

CIVIL ACTIONS § 4.01 (4th ed. 2018); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068 (4th ed. 2018).
21 See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496-97 (2004) (detailing state long-arm statutes).
22 See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of

Consent, 36 CARDozo L. REV. 1343, 1366-68 (2015) (highlighting that only Pennsylvania's
registration statute explicitly specifies that registration is a consent to jurisdiction).
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divided on whether the existing registration statutes operate as a consent to
general or dispute-blind jurisdiction for any and all claims arising anywhere
in the world, and, if so, whether such all-purpose consent schemes might be
an unconstitutional form of exorbitant jurisdiction. 23 But our recommendation avoids these divides. An explicit, defined-consent scheme, limited only
to those claims implicating well-recognized state adjudicative interests, promotes predictability, satisfies current constitutional limitations, and achieves
a balance between the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and sovereign
states.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly explores the prior jurisdictional landscape and the changes wrought by the Roberts Court's decisions over the last few years on the due-process limitations on assertions of
personal jurisdiction. Part III introduces consent as an alternative basis for
jurisdictional assertions, tracing its historical development from the antebellum era to modern times. In light of this history, Part IV proposes an explicit
consent-based registration scheme, which we suggest the ULC recommend,
that ex ante authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations in specified situations that sufficiently implicate state sovereign
interests. Part IV also highlights the normative and theoretical advantages of
such a scheme, especially with the ULC's participation. Part V details the
state sovereign interests that support the proposal and then dismisses any
conceivable constitutional challenges, whether based on the Due Process
Clause, the dormant commerce clause, or the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Part VI concludes with a plea for the states to amend their corporate registration framework to adopt an appropriate twenty-first century jurisdictional reach to protect their protective and prescriptive sovereign
interests.
II.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSONAL JURISDICTION UPHEAVAL

In 1945, International Shoe Co. v. Washington2^ famously reconceptu-

alized the adjudicative jurisdictional touchstone from a state's power over
those present within its territory to the fairness or reasonableness of jurisdiction in light of the defendant's forum contacts. 25 InternationalShoe sketched
three situations from its prior precedents as illustrations of reasonable jurisdictional assertions: (1) "when the activities of the corporation there have
not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on"; (2) when "the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature to justify suit against it on causes
of action entirely distinct from those activities"; and (3) when "the commis23 See id. at 1369-71 (collecting cases); Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding GeneralPersonal
Jurisdictionover TransnationalCorporationsfor Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN ST. L.
REV. 617, 669-72 (2017) (collecting cases).
24326
U.S. 310 (1945).
25
Id. at 316.
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sion of such [single or occasional] acts, because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient." 26
The second scenario, which predicates jurisdiction on activities "entirely
distinct" from the asserted cause of action, today is termed "general jurisdiction," while the term "specific jurisdiction" encompasses the other two
scenarios where adjudicative power depends on a relationship between the
suit and the nonresident defendant's in-state activities. 27
The Supreme Court embarked on two distinct thirteen-year quests during the twentieth century, separated by almost twenty years, to further define
fairness in the jurisdictional context. Beginning with International Shoe in
1945 and ending with Hanson v. Denckla in 1958, the Court developed the
required contacts analysis and then added the principle that such contacts
depended upon purposeful forum activity by the nonresident defendant. 28
From 1977 to 1990, the Court first banished jurisdiction over property for
unrelated claims and then attempted to provide greater clarity on the necessary purposeful forum conduct for both specific and general jurisdiction. 29
Thereafter, though, the Rehnquist Court withdrew from the adjudicative
power field after failing to coalesce around a single majority opinion in either of its two attempts, 30 leaving the lower federal and state courts to their
own devices until the Roberts Court's recent jurisdictional revival. 31
26

Id. at 317-18.
See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126-27 (2014). The Supreme Court
first employed this terminology in 1984, borrowing the terms from an influential law review
article. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (mentioning general jurisdiction);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984) (discussing
both specific and general jurisdiction); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (coining the
terms).
28 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
29 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Calder, 465 U.S. 783; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3 See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607 (plurality opinion); id. at 628 (White, J., concurring); id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring); Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 108-13 (plurality opinion); id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 121-22 (Stevens,
J., concurring). The severe constriction in the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction docket
and the departures of certain Justices who pressed their colleagues to hear personal jurisdiction
cases also likely contributed to the Court's refusal to resolve jurisdictional cases during this
time. See Troy A. McKenzie, Revisiting PersonalJurisdiction, at 6 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
31 See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic
Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) (highlighting the Supreme Court's
2011 personal jurisdiction decisions were its first since 1990); Howard M. Wasserman, The
Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 317 (2012) (noting that,
after Burnham, the Court did not decide any personal jurisdiction cases for over twenty years).
27
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During the Court's jurisdictional hiatus, the lower courts developed and
applied a framework for adjudicative authority constructed, to the extent
possible, from the Supreme Court's binding pronouncements. This undertaking was not an easy task, predominantly due to the Supreme Court's avoidance of-or inability to resolve-several foundational jurisdictional issues. 32
Not surprisingly, then, the lower courts' jurisdictional decisions on quite a
few issues became discombobulated, with deep splits in result and reasoning. 3 3 Nevertheless, certain broad jurisdictional precepts enjoyed widespread
acceptance.
One of these uniform precepts was that general jurisdiction was appropriate anytime a defendant's in-state business activities were substantial,
continuous, and systematic, which authorized jurisdiction against large national and international business enterprises doing business throughout the
United States in any state, irrespective of the nature of the controversy. 34
Some lower courts went much further and authorized general jurisdiction
based on almost any repeated activity in the forum, such as a nonresident
defendant's sporadic sales to forum residents or the possibility that forum
residents accessed the defendant's interactive website. 35 But despite the disagreement on the outermost limits of general jurisdiction, the cases concurred
that general jurisdiction was available over a nonresident defendant conducting continuous and substantial business activities from a physical location within the forum. 36 So a corporation like Wal-Mart, with stores in each
and every state, was subject to general jurisdiction in each and every stateand this was so well accepted that it routinely went unchallenged. 37
The Supreme Court's limited guidance on general jurisdiction during
the twentieth century seemingly supported this accepted interpretation. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 38 held that Ohio could exercise
adjudicatory jurisdiction over a Philippine Islands mining corporation with
respect to claims unrelated to its forum activities when it was conducting a
"continuous and systematic, but limited part of its general business" in the
32 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (avoiding
presented issue on the relationship required for specific personal jurisdiction by resolving case
based on forum selection clause).
3 See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 3, at 230.
34 Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General
Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIo ST. L.J. 101, 114-15 (2015)
(noting that "[t]reatises printed as black letter law that corporations were subject to general
jurisdiction wherever they engaged in a sufficiently high level of business activity" and that a
leading casebook presented it as settled law).
35 See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 807, 867-86 (2004) (discussing examples).
36 See id.
3 The unique circumstances in the rare jurisdictional challenges raised by Wal-Mart indicate the ubiquity of this understanding. See Follette v. Clairol, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 840, 846
(W.D. La. 1993) (holding that the exercise of general jurisdiction over Wal-Mart in this particular case was neither fair nor reasonable when the plaintiffs filed suit in the forum solely to
take advantage of a longer limitations period), aff'd mem., 998 F.3d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993).
38 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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state by supervising, from an Ohio corporate office, the necessarily limited
rehabilitation of the company's properties during the Japanese occupation of
the Philippine Islands. 39 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall,40 on the other hand, determined that a Colombian corporation providing helicopter transportation in South America was not amenable in Texas
for its non-suit-related activities there, as such activities were dissimilar to
the "continuous and systematic general business contacts" existing in Perkins.41 In another decision, the Supreme Court did not dispute the proposition, which was vital to the decision below under review, that a nationwide
insurance company "doing business" in all fifty states could be subject to
dispute-blind jurisdiction in every state. 42 So the lower courts appeared to
follow dutifully the Supreme Court's insinuations by holding that "continuous and systematic" forum business activities of a substantial nature sufficed
for general jurisdiction.
Scholars, though, often critiqued this sweeping expanse for general jurisdiction. 43 But even the critics acknowledged that a broad reach for general
jurisdiction served as a backstop to ensure an accessible forum when the
Supreme Court's defendant-centric understanding of specific jurisdiction in
its decisions during the latter half of the twentieth century barred reasonable
jurisdictional assertions."
These decisions restricted specific jurisdiction by requiring every
named nonresident defendant (by itself or through an agent) to perform activities that either purposefully sought the benefits and protections of the
forum's laws or targeted the forum for some benefit or advantage. 45 Although
this purposeful-availment requirement did not necessitate the actual physical
presence of the defendant or its agents in the forum state, out-of-state conduct at least had to be "purposefully directed" at the forum. 4 6 This occurred,
for instance, when a nonresident defendant executed a contract with a "sub39

Id. at 438, 447-48.

40 466 U.S. 408 (1984).

41 Id. at 416. The corporation's Texas activities included a singular trip of its president to
Texas for a contract negotiating session, payments drawn on a Texas bank, and purchases of
helicopters, equipment, and training from a Texas corporation. Id. at 410-11, 416-18.
42 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 317 & n.23 (1981) (plurality opinion) (concluding "Allstate was at all times present and
doing business in Minnesota" and did not question jurisdiction in Minnesota courts); id. at
329-30 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("By virtue of doing business in Minnesota, Allstate was
aware that it could be sued in the Minnesota courts.").
43 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer et al., A GeneralLook at GeneralJurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
721, 725-26 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, GeneralLook]; Allan R. Stein, Styles ofArgument
and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758
(1987); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676
(1988).
" See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 132-39 (arguing general jurisdiction was an "unpleasant necessity" due to the
limitations of specific jurisdiction).
45 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985); Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 417; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
46 Burger King, 471 U.S. at
476.
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stantial connection" to the forum; 4 7 "expressly aimed" intentional tortious
actions at the forum; 48 or manufactured or distributed products causing harm
within the forum, coupled with efforts "to serve, directly or indirectly," the
in-state market for its product.49 Yet many times, this availment requirement
prevented such apparently reasonable forum choices as suing all the defendants in a products case in the forum in which the accident occurred.50 In
these situations where specific jurisdiction was not available, a broad understanding of general jurisdiction sometimes allowed an alternative forum
where the plaintiff could sue all the alleged wrongdoers.5 1
Another concern regarding specific jurisdiction was that the Court
never defined the necessary relationship between the defendant, the forum,
and the controversy. Although the Supreme Court declared that the litigation
must "arise out of," be "related to," or be "connected with" the defendant's
forum activities, 52 these alternative formulations hinted at very different linkages. The Supreme Court declined, despite two opportunities, to provide additional guidance. 53 Without the Supreme Court's guidance, a bewildering
array of different approaches developed in the lower courts: narrow approaches allowing specific jurisdiction only when the injury occurred in the
forum or the defendant's forum activities were the "proximate cause" of the
injury, ill-defined approaches requiring a "substantial," "causal," or "sufficient" connection between the defendant's forum activities and the litigation,
and expansive approaches that required a minimal "but for" relationship
between the defendant's forum actions and the suit or adjudged the necessary
relationship on a "sliding scale." 54 As a practical matter, though, this disagreement had little impact on the jurisdictional power of courts, as the courts
4 Id. at 479. This determination is dependent upon the contract's provisions, the parties'
negotiations, the contemplated future consequences, and the actual course of conduct under the
contract. See id.
48 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
49 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
5o See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the ConstitutionalLaw of PersonalJurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 19, 90 (1990).
51 Cf Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The PredictabilityPrinciplein PersonalJurisdiction
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a "Generally" Too Broad, but "Specifically" Too
NarrowApproach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 216-17 (2005) [hereinafter
Rhodes, PredictabilityPrinciple] (discussing the inclination of courts to expand general jurisdiction to support reasonable jurisdictional assertions when confronting the limits of specific
jurisdiction).
52 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 ("arise out of or relate to"); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("arise out of or are connected with").
53 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (avoiding presented
issue on the relationship required for specific personal jurisdiction by resolving case based on
forum selection clause); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415
n.10 (declining to address arguments posed by Justice Brennan's dissent regarding "(1)
whether the terms 'arising out of' and 'related to' describe different connections between a
cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a
cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary").
54 See Rhodes, PredictabilityPrinciple, supra note 51, at 201-08. For further descriptions
and insightful critiques of the various approaches that developed, see Carol Andrews, Another
Look at General Personal Jurisdiction,47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1026-48 (2012), and

2020]

A New State RegistrationAct

387

turned to general jurisdiction when the outermost limits of specific jurisdiction were uncertain.55
The broad expanse of general jurisdiction thus made up for the deficiencies in specific jurisdiction doctrine. This approach came with normative
costs, however. General jurisdiction presented opportunities for blatant forum shopping, authorizing jurisdiction in locales that had minimal or no interest in the suit. 5 6 For instance, a Texas citizen could rely on general
jurisdiction to bring a claim regarding a slip-and-fall in a Texas Wal-Mart
store in any state in the nation, trying to obtain the best potential recovery in
light of limitations periods, conflicts of law, procedural rules, and sympathetic jurists and jurors.57 Moreover, in the transnational context, many other
nations abhorred the expansive American view of general jurisdiction, a constant source of friction in attempts to negotiate a treaty on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.58 As a result, scholars frequently
championed the broadening of specific jurisdiction, which would allow a
concomitant narrowing of general jurisdiction to accord with international
standards and limit blatant national and international forum shopping. 59
But rather than first expanding specific jurisdiction as recommended by
scholars, the Roberts Court's twenty-first century jurisdictional upheaval discarded general "doing business" jurisdiction while contemporaneously re-

Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profilesfor Specific Jurisdiction,38 IND.
L. REV. 343, 348-73 (2005).
" See, e.g., Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 & n.9 (Conn. 1995) (declining
to resolve specific jurisdiction issue dependent on the required connection between the litigation and the defendant's forum activities when general jurisdiction was available).
56 See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63
S.C. L. REV. 527, 540-41 (2012) [hereinafter Stein, Meaning] ("A handful of judicial districts
across the country have become magnets for litigation against large, interstate corporations
because of their tendency to render large jury awards. The more permissive the constitutional
standards for the exercise of general jurisdiction, the more these problems arise.").
" Cf Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1990) (plaintiff injured in Pennsylvania by combine sued manufacturer in Mississippi, relying on general jurisdiction, in order
to take advantage of state's six-year limitations period for tort actions).
" See Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 89, 95-96 (1999) ("The Europeans' principal objection to U.S. jurisdictional law is its
proclivity to base general jurisdiction on rather thin contacts.").
5 See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 43, at 667-70; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 27,
at 1139, 1141-44, 1177-79. On the other hand, though, if personal jurisdiction limits are constitutionally mandated by the Due Process Clause, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, such pure policy considerations, divorced from questions of state sovereignty and
individual liberty interests, should have little force. Cf Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Liberty,
Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 627-43 (2007)
[hereinafter Rhodes, Liberty] (discussing appropriate considerations in ascertaining a state's
permissible reach under due process). Some scholars have, in the same vein, recently critiqued
the premise that an expansion of specific jurisdiction necessarily entails a restriction of general
jurisdiction. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 34, at 124 n.105 (citing scholarship to this
effect by Kristina Angus); Stanley E. Cox, The Missing "Why" of GeneralJurisdiction, 76 U.
PITT. L. REV. 153, 174 (2014).
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stricting (instead of expanding) specific jurisdiction. 60 The Court, despite
occasional paeans to an expansive role for specific jurisdiction in its opinions slashing general jurisdiction, 61 has not followed such dictum when confronted with specific jurisdiction cases, but rather has announced new
restraints to tighten the confines of state jurisdictional authority. 62 The uncertain future created by these newfound constraints in the Roberts Court's general jurisdiction decisions will be discussed first before turning to the Court's
specific jurisdiction holdings.
A.

The Demise of General "Doing Business" Jurisdiction

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown63 did not appear a
likely vehicle for kindling a jurisdictional revolution, as the case addressed a
rather "sprawling" assertion of adjudicative authority that violated well-established jurisdictional norms.M The issue in the case was whether a North
Carolina state court could exercise general jurisdiction over Turkish and European indirect subsidiaries of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
when the tires manufactured by the Turkish subsidiary allegedly caused a
fatal accident in France that killed two American teenagers from North Carolina. 65 The only indirect business tie those foreign subsidiaries had with
North Carolina was that a very small percentage of the tires the subsidiaries
made abroad reached North Carolina, being distributed by other Goodyear
affiliates through the stream of commerce. 66 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, unanimously held, in accord with its prior general
jurisdiction precedents, that the state court's jurisdictional assertion was improper, as the foreign subsidiaries' "attenuated connections to the State ...
fall far short of the [sic] 'the continuous and systematic general business

.

60 Cf Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court's New Approach to PersonalJurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107, 108-09 (2015) ("A limited scope for general jurisdiction was
supposed to have followed, rather than preceded, an expansion of specific jurisdiction.").
61 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133
n.10 (2014).
62 See infra Part IIB; accord Dodson, supra note 15, at 24 (noting specific jurisdiction
has
narrowed through recent cases that have "considerably tighte[ned]" the necessary relationship
between the defendant, the forum, and the claim); Jonathan R. Nash, NationalPersonalJurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 511 (2019) ("Personal jurisdiction has always constrained plaintiffs' access to courts; recent Supreme Court decisions impose even more severe limits
63 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
6 Id. at 929.
65

Id. at 918.

Id. at 921. The foreign subsidiaries had not registered to do business in North Carolina;
did not operate a place of business in North Carolina; and did not themselves advertise, solicit,
sell, or ship tires to North Carolina customers. Id. Their tires were predominantly designed for
sale in the European and Asian markets; while the tire at issue bore the markings necessary for
sale in the U.S., there was no evidence that this particular type of tire had ever been distributed
in North Carolina. Id. at 921-22.
66
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contacts' necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them
on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State." 67
Goodyear was, in the words of Professor Linda Silberman, "an easy
case" under established precedents. 68 As the Supreme Court highlighted,
under the lower court's theory predicating all-purpose general jurisdiction on
the stream-of-commerce flow of goods into the forum, "any substantial
manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for
relief, wherever its products are distributed," a premise that the Supreme
Court had refused to embrace even when the product had caused an injury in
the forum. 69 As a result, the outcome was never really in doubt.
Yet Goodyear's true significance was introducing a new metaphor into
the general jurisdiction lexicon. The Court's opinion, while retaining earlier
iterations that substantial "continuous and systematic" affiliations were necessary for general jurisdiction, added to the description that such affiliations
had to render the defendant "essentially at home" in the forum.70 The Court
explained that the "paradigm forum" for general jurisdiction over a natural
person is domicile, while for corporations "it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home."7 1 Citing an article by
Professor Lea Brilmayer, the Court parenthetically described a corporation's
state of incorporation and principal place of business as the "'paradig[m]'
bases for general jurisdiction." 72 But the Court never indicated that general
jurisdiction was limited to such paradigms or other true "homes" of the
corporation, instead always describing general jurisdiction under its prior
precedents as places where the corporation was "essentially at home,"
"fairly regarded as at home," or "in [a] sense at home." 73
67 Id. at 929 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416
(1984)).
68 Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 677
(2015).
69 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 296 (1980)).
o Id. at 919 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
71

Id. at 924.

72 Id.

(citing Brilmayer, General Look, supra note 43, at 728). Professor Brilmayer's article proposed that general jurisdiction extended beyond these paradigms to corporations engaged in a large quantum of intrastate activity that rose "to the level . . . of an insider," such
that "relegating the defendant to the political process [was] fair." Brilmayer, General Look,
supra note 43, at 742-43, 746-47.
7' Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 924, 929. For examples of the scholarly debate after Goodyear on the significance and potential meanings of the "essentially at home" metaphor, see
Andrews, supra note 54, at 1059-75; Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling
Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 McGEORGE L. REV. 865, 886-900 (2013); Michael
H. Hoffheimer, GeneralPersonalJurisdictionAfter Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 581-604 (2012); Lonny Hoffman, Further Thinking About
Vicarious Jurisdiction:Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 34 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 765, 777-82 (2013); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of
Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 215-17
(2011); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 16, at 425-30; Stein, Meaning, supra note 56,
at 531-47.

Harvard Journal on Legislation

390

[Vol. 57

Just three years later, though, the Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman74
rejected as "unacceptably grasping" the longstanding understanding (as reiterated in Goodyear) that a "substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business" supported general jurisdiction, downplayed the "essentially"
modifier from Goodyear's "at home" language, and held that general jurisdiction is only appropriate when a corporate defendant is "at home" in the
forum. 7 5 "At home," Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court continued, en-

compasses only the paradigm bases of state of incorporation and principal
place of business, unless perhaps in an exceptional case, such as where the
forum is the corporation's temporary de facto or surrogate principal place of
business. 7 6 And through these newly announced constraints, Daimler utterly
upended the prior judicial understanding of personal jurisdiction.
The Argentinian plaintiffs in Daimlerhad filed suit in California federal
court alleging the German public stock company Daimler was vicariously
liable for the purported actions of its Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz
Argentina, in collaborating with Argentinian security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, or murder plaintiffs and their family members during Argentina's "Dirty War."''7 7 After Daimler moved to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs responded that Daimler was amenable to California's jurisdiction because general jurisdiction was appropriate in California
over yet another Daimler indirect subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA
("MBUSA"). The plaintiffs urged that MBUSA's extensive California contacts-including a regional headquarters in the state, several other physical
California facilities, and billions of dollars of forum sales-both supported
general jurisdiction and were imputable to Daimler for jurisdictional purposes under an agency theory.78 Daimler did not contest that the California
courts could exercise general jurisdiction over MBUSA (presumably because the district court's consideration of Daimler's motion to dismiss predated Goodyear by several years); instead, Daimler urged that attributing the
California jurisdictional contacts of its subsidiary to Daimler itself violated
due process. 7 9

571 U.S. 117 (2014).
Id. at 136-39. Although Daimler quoted from Goodyear's "essentially at home" language in the course of the opinion, see id. at 122, 127, 133 n.11, 139, the Court's holding was
that the lower court erred by concluding that Daimler "was at home in California, and hence
subject to suit there." Id. at 139; see also id. at 136 ("Daimler's slim contacts with [California] hardly render it at home there."); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017)
(citing Daimler as establishing that a state cannot "hale an out-of-state corporation before its
courts when the corporation is not 'at home' in the State and the episode-in-suit occurred
elsewhere").
76
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129-32, 138-39 & n.19.
77 Id. at 120-22.
7 Id. at 123; see also id. at 142, 148 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
79
Id. at 124, 133-34.
74

7
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The primary question presented to the Supreme Court thus involved the
thorny issue of imputation of a subsidiary's contacts to a parent. 0 Indeed, the
argument that if MBUSA's contacts were attributable to Daimler such contacts did not suffice for general personal jurisdiction first appeared in a footnote to Daimler's brief on the merits and was also stressed by a handful of its
amici. 1 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, after a quick dismissal of the particular agency theory relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, sidestepped this jurisdictional imputation issue, instead holding that Daimler was not "at home"
in California, even assuming the propriety of attributing all of MBUSA's
California contacts to Daimler.8 2
The Court rejected the premise that general jurisdiction was appropriate
"in every State in which a corporation 'engages in a substantial, continuous,
and systematic course of business."' 8 3 Instead, the relevant analysis was the
one alluded to-but not expanded upon-in Goodyear: was the defendant
"at home" in the forum?8 4 The Court explained that in all except the most
unusual circumstances, a defendant would be at home in no more than two
jurisdictions: the state of incorporation and the state in which the corporation
maintained its principal place of business." This was because "home" did
not depend solely on the extent of the defendant's forum contacts, but rather
"an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety" throughout the
globe, as a corporation operating in many jurisdictions "can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them."8 6 Daimler, as a German company with a
principal place of business in Germany, was therefore not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the California courts for claims arising from alleged actions in
Argentina, despite MBUSA's California presence. 7
Yet the Supreme Court had other paths to render judgment in Daimler's
favor. As Professor Richard Freer explained, Daimler, like Goodyear, was
an "easy case[ ]" because it involved a foreign defendant with minimal
forum contacts of its own that were not substantial enough to support gen-

&

o See Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot "at Home"? Daimler v. Bauman and the
End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGs L.J. 233, 287-89 (2014); Robertson
Rhodes, Business, supra note 11, at 784. For insightful in-depth analysis of the attribution
issue, see Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Lonny S. Hoffman, The Case Against VicariousJurisdiction, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (2004); and Hoffman,
supra note 73.
" Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134; see also id. at 146-47 & n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 134-39.
83
1 Id. at 138.
84 See id. at 137-39. The Court's iterations of the test as being where the defendant was
"at home" was a change from the allusion in Goodyear, which, as discussed previously, described general jurisdiction as appropriate where the defendant was "essentially at home,"
"fairly regarded as at home," or "in [a] sense at home." See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops.,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 924, 929 (2011).
15 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (citing, as a potential "exceptional case," its description of
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
8
6 Id. at 139 n.20.
1 Id. at 139.
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eral jurisdiction even under prior doctrine. 8 The Court could have held, as it
hinted, that imputation of MBUSA's contacts to Daimler was not warranted.8 9 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's attribution holding was aptly described
by Professor Lonny Hoffman as not only "breathtaking" in scope, but also
an "egregious example" of "blindly applying substantive law doctrines" in
the jurisdictional context. 90 The Court also could have followed the approach
in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, which, while disagreeing with the majority's "at home" limitation, concluded that California's exercise of jurisdiction was "unreasonable given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a
foreign defendant based on foreign conduct." 91 Even Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion highlighted "risks to international comity" from an expansive
understanding of general jurisdiction, which might have been used to limit
sharply general jurisdiction only in the transnational context at issue in both
Daimler and Goodyear.92 But the Court appeared committed to restricting,
based almost exclusively on policy concerns regarding forum shopping and
comity, the constitutional limits of general personal jurisdiction against business enterprises in all cases, international and domestic. 93
The Court reaffirmed this commitment in the domestic context in its
most recent general personal jurisdiction decision, BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell.94 Although the outcome was not surprising given the new limits pronounced in Daimler and Goodyear, this was the Court's first opportunity to
apply its newfound jurisdictional restrictions in a context where general jurisdiction previously was routinely exercised by lower courts. 95 BNSF involved two consolidated suits filed in Montana state court by allegedly
injured railroad employees against their railroad employer under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").96 The workers, who neither resided in
nor apparently ever worked for BNSF in Montana, did not contend their
injuries had any connection to the state; instead, the alleged jurisdictional
grounds included that BNSF was "doing business" and "found within"
Montana by operating over 2000 miles of railroad track there (approximately
6% of its track), maintaining one of its twenty-four automotive facilities in
" Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1161, 1162 (2015) [hereinafter Freer, Specific Concerns].
89 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134-36.
90 Hoffman, supra note 73, at 774-75.
91 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 143-44 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
92 See id. at 140-42.
9 See id. at 136-42. As other scholars have noted, the Court's newfound limitations on
general "doing business" jurisdiction appear incompatible with the Court's approval in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), of transient presence jurisdiction over individuals. See Cox, supra note 59, at 176 (collecting sources); Cody J. Jacobs, If CorporationsAre
People, Why Can't They Play Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. 1, 24 (2016) (arguing asymmetry between treatment of individuals and corporations regarding transient jurisdiction justifies jurisdiction predicated on in-forum service on officers acting on the corporation's behalf).
94 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1562 (2017).
95 Cf Freer, Specific Concerns, supra note 88, at 1162 (explaining Daimler and Goodyear
could have been decided the same way under prior doctrine).
96
BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1553-54.
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the state, employing 2100 Montana workers (around 5% of its workforce),
and generating almost 10% of its total revenue from the state. 97
Despite its ongoing activities in Montana, though, BNSF was neither
incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. 98 And therefore,
according to the Supreme Court, BNSF was not "at home" in Montana and
could not be sued there for claims unrelated to its forum activities. 99 The
Court first confronted and then dismissed the workers' argument that the
FELA statutorily authorized state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over railroads doing some business within the state before turning to the
constitutional limits of adjudicative authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.100 Quoting extensively from her prior writings in Daimler and Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion reiterated that general jurisdiction
is appropriate only when the defendant's affiliations with the state render it
"essentially at home" there, and only in an "exceptional case," such as perhaps illustrated by Perkins where a corporation temporarily relocated during
a war, would this occur outside the corporation's principal place of business
and state of incorporation.101 These limitations, the Court highlighted, govern
"all state-court assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants," irrespective of "the type of claim asserted or business enterprise
sued."

102

The Supreme Court did remand the case to the Montana Supreme Court
to address a further argument that the workers raised below but the Montana
Supreme Court did not reach: whether BNSF consented to personal jurisdiction in Montana by obtaining an authorization to do business in the state and
by designating an in-state agent for service of process. The Supreme Court
proffered no hints on the appropriate outcome of this issue, instead relying
on its position as "a court of review, not of first view." 103 But this has led to
more uncertainty and recurrent litigation, as lower courts have divided on
97

Id. at 1554.

98 Id. BNSF was incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Texas. See

id.

99

Id. at 1558-59.
.oo Id. at 1555-58. The Justices all concurred that the FELA provision relied upon by the
workers did not authorize personal jurisdiction, but instead embodied a venue provision for
federal courts and a grant of subject matter jurisdiction for state courts. See id.; see also id. at
1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring and dissenting) ("I concur in the Court's conclusion that [the
FELA] does not confer personal jurisdiction over railroads on state courts.").
101 Id. at 1558.
102 Id. at 1559. Although the Court did not discuss forum shopping in
its opinion, the
underlying briefing repeatedly alleged that Montana was a magnet forum for FELA claims.
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 10-13, BNSF, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (No. 16-405). During
oral argument, BNSF's counsel contended Montana represented "a true wild west" for FELA
claims, which then provoked a four-minute colloquy between the Justices and counsel regarding forum shopping. See The Supreme Court, 2017 Term Leading Cases: BNSF Railway Co.

v. Tyrrell, 131

HARV.

L.

REV.

333, 341 (2017).

BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)).
The Montana Supreme Court subsequently held that its registration statute, which specifically
provides that the appointment of a registered agent "does not by itself create the basis for
personal jurisdiction over the represented entity," in light of constitutional due process limita103
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whether the existing corporate registration statutes operate as a consent to
jurisdiction, and, if so, whether allowing registration statutes to serve as an
equivalent basis for all-purpose adjudicative jurisdiction would violate constitutional limitations.104
In any event, general contacts jurisdiction is now only available in the
state of incorporation or a principal place of business of a domestic corporation (and only available over foreign corporations in extreme situations
where an American forum is its de facto principal place of business, such as
in Perkins). This leaves specific jurisdiction as the only available option for
a defendant's amenability in most American states.105 But, contemporaneously with eviscerating general "doing business" jurisdiction, the Roberts
Court limited specific jurisdiction.
B.

The New Restraints on Specific Jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction is a more limited form of adjudicative power over
a nonresident defendant, subjecting the defendant to amenability only in
those cases where a sufficient relationship exists between the litigation and
the nonresident's in-state activities. 106 Its essential requirements are that the
nonresident defendant purposefully establish contacts with the forum state
and that the plaintiff's cause of action be adequately related to the defendant's forum activities. Specific jurisdiction, the Court promised, was supposed to "flourish" after the demise of general "doing business"
jurisdiction.1 0 7 But instead, the Roberts Court's jurisdictional doctrine has
engrafted further restrictions on exercising this already limited adjudicative
power, first by imposing a more stringent examination of whether the defendant itself (rather than an intermediary or the plaintiff) created the connec-

tions, prevents registration from operating as a consent to personal jurisdiction. DeLeon v.
BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2018) (quoting 35 M.C.A § 35-7-115 (2007)).
1" See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 23, at 669-72 & nn.282-89 (collecting cases). Scholars
are divided as well. Numerous scholars, including one of us, have argued that all-purpose
jurisdictional consent predicated on corporate registration alone exceeds constitutional jurisdictional limits. See, e.g., Brilmayer, General Look, supra note 43, at 757-60; Alfred Hill,
Choice of Law and Jurisdictionin the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 981-82 (1981);
Monestier, supra note 22, at 1346-48; Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Consent to General Jurisdiction
Based on Registering to Do Business: A Limited Role for General Jurisdiction (unpublished
manuscript); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 16, at 442-44. But other scholars view
all-purpose jurisdictional consent more favorably, albeit while recognizing that whether a nonresident of the forum should also obtain the benefit is a more difficult issue. See, e.g., Oscar G.
Chase, Consent to JudicialJurisdiction:The Foundationof "Registration"Statutes, 73 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 159, 162-68 (2018); Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General

Jurisdiction, 95

NEB.

L.

REV.

477, 480-81 (2016).

See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, PersonalJurisdictionandAliens, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1205, 1207 (2018) (recognizing domestic defendants will always be "at home" in some
U.S. forum, while foreign defendants will not, leaving specific jurisdiction "as the only
alternative").
106 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126-27
(2014).
15

107

Id. at 133 n.10.
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tion and then by tightening the relationship required between the defendant's
activities and the plaintiff's claims.108
In the first specific jurisdiction case decided by the Roberts Court, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,109 the Court considered whether a
New Jersey state court could exercise specific jurisdiction in Robert Nicastro's products liability action against the English manufacturer J. McIntyre
Machinery when that manufacturer sold a metal shearer to its exclusive independent U.S. distributor (McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.), which then
sold the shearer to Nicastro's New Jersey employer.110 A sharply divided
Supreme Court concluded, without a majority opinion, that generalized
"targeting" by the foreign manufacturer of the entire United States as a market for its products was insufficient to support jurisdiction in New Jersey, at
least, according to the concurrence, in the absence of regular forum sales.'
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, though, the effect of the Court's
holding was to allow J. McIntyre to "wash its hands" of liability merely by
assigning its American sales function to an exclusive, independent
distributor.112
The Court's next specific jurisdiction case, Walden v. Fiore,113 further
refined the type of "targeting" necessary for specific jurisdiction; it held that
the defendant's mere awareness that the plaintiff will feel the effects of the
defendant's conduct in a particular forum is insufficient to amount to targeting that forum for jurisdictional purposes. 114 The Court reasoned, in a relatively brief opinion, that a police officer's alleged actions in drafting a false

"o In an apt metaphor, Professor Richard Freer has referred to these constraints as two
"walls" or "barriers" between plaintiffs and access to reasonable jurisdictional fora. See Richard D. Freer, PersonalJurisdiction:The Walls Blocking an Appeal to Rationality, 72 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 99, 100 (2019), https://cdn.vanderbilt.edu/vu-wp0/wp-content/uploads/sites/
278/2019/02/06121950/Personal-Jurisdiction-The-Walls-Blocking-an-Appeal-to-Rationality.pdf [https://perma.cc/H364-E5WG].
109 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
"o Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
".Id. at 887-89 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion concluded
that McIntyre did not appropriately "manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign" because the company did not target New Jersey on its own for the transmission of goods,
but rather "directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States" as a whole. Id. at 882-87
(plurality opinion). Justice Breyer's concurring opinion reasoned that the Court's prior cases
had never considered a similar singular sale through a distributor as sufficient for jurisdiction.
Id. at 888-89 (Breyer, J., concurring). For critical commentary, see Patrick J. Borchers, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2012) (urging Kennedy's plurality opinion was "quite possibly the most poorly reasoned and obtuse decision of the entire minimum contacts era");
Megan M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J. INTERNET L. 8 (2012) ("[T]he
opinions issued by the Court-especially in McIntyre-fall far short of the clear-cut guidance
that lower courts and litigants seek."); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining
the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 491-96
(2012) (contending the plurality opinion is perplexing, deficient, and poorly reasoned).
112 Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 893-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
114 See id. at 291.
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probable cause affidavit to seize the Nevada plaintiffs' poker winnings at the
Atlanta airport had an effect in Nevada only "because Nevada is where
[plaintiffs] chose to be at a time when they desired to use the funds," and
not because "the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way."11 5 Thus, because the defendant had not purposefully "create[d]
contacts with the forum State," jurisdiction was improper. 116
As Professor Scott Dodson explained, Walden's holding demands "a
direct link between the defendant and the forum that cannot be bridged by
the plaintiff's activities or presence."117 Such a requirement, though, undercuts the venerable holding of Calder v. Jones,' where the Court reasoned
that the plaintiff's forum contacts "may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence." 119 Although the Walden Court
attempted to distinguish Calder, its efforts were not convincing; instead, as
we previously opined, "Walden is a 'stealth overruling' of Calder-ifa new
case were to arise today with the exact same fact pattern as Calder, it is
unlikely that the Court would sustain jurisdiction." 120 The uncertainty created by the Court's de facto disavowal of Calder impacts numerous cases, as
controversies involving the "aiming" of intentional conduct to cause in-forum effects are growing exponentially, due to ever-expanding commercial
and personal interactions over the web. 121
After constructing these new obstacles to purposefully targeting the forum in Nicastro and Walden, the Court next turned to the relationship required between the defendant's forum activities and the litigation in its most
recent specific jurisdiction decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court.12 2 This pharmaceutical products liability suit against Bristol-Myers
for its blood-thinning drug Plavix was filed in California state court by consumers from California and thirty-three other states. 123 Bristol-Myers sold
almost a billion dollars of Plavix to California consumers between 2006 and
2012 with the help of its 250 California sales representatives, but it had not
developed, manufactured, labeled, packaged, or established the marketing
strategy for the drug in any of its five research and development facilities in
115
11
6

Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.

Dodson, supra note 15, at 24-25.
11 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
119 Id. at 788 (allowing a defamation case to go forward in California against a journalist
and editor who had no connection with the state other than the expectation that individuals in
California would read their article).
120 Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 3, at 254 (footnotes omitted).
121 See Allan Erbsen, PersonalJurisdictionBased on the Local Effects of Intentional
Misconduct, 57 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 385, 389-90 (2015) (noting hundreds of cases relied on
Walden in a two-year period); Zoe Niesel, #PersonalJurisdiction:A New Age of Internet Contacts, 94 IND. L.J. 103, 127-38 (2019) (documenting the rise of web traffic and e-commerce
over the last two decades and the resulting jurisdictional challenges); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in PersonalJurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1301,
1304 (2012) (noting the rapid rise of effects-based cases filed each year).
122 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
12 3
117

Id. at 1778.
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California.124 Bristol-Myers challenged whether the California courts could
exercise jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, who did
not allege that they obtained the drug through a California source or had any
injury in the state. 125 The California Supreme Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge, reasoning that, although general jurisdiction was not available since Bristol-Myers was not at home in California, specific jurisdiction
was appropriate under a "sliding scale" relationship because of the company's extensive California contacts and the similarity between the claims of
the nonresidents and the California residents. 126
But the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito,
reversed. The opinion held, over Justice Sotomayor's solo dissent, that the
state court's "sliding scale approach," which was described by the Court as
resembling "a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction," contravened
its precedents. 127 The Court thereby rejected the notion that specific jurisdiction may be relaxed because of the defendant's extensive unrelated forum
contacts; instead, "a connection between the forum and specific claims at
issue" is required. 128 This necessary "affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy" typically arises through an "activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the state's
regulation." 129 Here, the nonresidents "were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California." 130 As a result, specific
jurisdiction did not exist over their claims.
Yet while the Court thereby rejected the sliding scale approach used by
some lower courts, its decision, as Professor Patrick Borchers highlighted,
"shines little light on what counts as a related contact." 131 Lower courts still
employ a bewildering array of often ill-defined approaches to this problem,
running the gamut from narrow approaches limiting specific jurisdiction to
in-forum injuries proximately caused by the defendant's forum activities to
expansive approaches merely requiring a minimal "but for" relationship between the defendant's forum actions and the suit. 1 3 2 While Bristol-Myers emphasized the necessity of a "connection" or an "affiliation," how much of a
connection is necessary? Would it have been enough if the marketing strat-

Id.
Id.
126 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 887-89 (Cal.
2016), rev'd,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). Under the sliding scale approach, "the more wide ranging the defendant's forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and
the claim." Id. at 889 (internal quotations omitted).
127 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1780, 1781 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011)).
130
Id. at 1781.
131 Borchers, Extending, supra note 15, at 437.
132 See Rhodes, PredictabilityPrinciple, supra note 51, at 201-08.
124
125
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egy for Plavix had been established in California? What if some of the research for the drug was conducted by Bristol-Myers in one of its five
California facilities? Or could the labeling and packaging of the drug in California be a sufficiently related contact for specific jurisdiction?
These questions went unanswered, leaving no meaningful guidance on
the expanse of specific jurisdiction, a boundary which is critical in ensuring
the availability of a forum for injured plaintiffs after the demise of general
"doing business" jurisdiction. Consider Nicastro again. Is there anywhere in
the United States Nicastro could have brought his claims against J. McIntyre, who purposefully distributed its shearing machines throughout the
United States via an independent exclusive U.S. distributor? General jurisdiction is not possible because J. McIntyre is incorporated with a principal
place of business in the United Kingdom. With respect to specific jurisdiction, one option is perhaps Nevada, where Nicastro's employer first learned
of the metal shearer from representatives of J. McIntyre and its distributor
before purchasing one from the distributor. 133 Although J. McIntyre thus
"purposefully availed" itself of Nevada by directly marketing its products
there, is that a sufficient connection for specific jurisdiction when the employer purchased the machine from a distributor in Ohio and the injury occurred in New Jersey? Alternatively, could Nicastro have sued J. McIntyre in
Ohio, where it delivered the machine to its independent distributor who then
sold it to New Jersey? That would appear to be the best candidate for a U.S.
forum 13 4 -but

an ominous passage from Bristol-Myers opens the possibility

that it does not suffice.
Bristol-Myers rejected "a last ditch contention" by the plaintiffs: that
the company's decision to use a California corporation as one of its national
distributors for Plavix established another basis for personal jurisdiction. 135
The Court, returning to Walden, first highlighted that a defendant's relationship with a third party, standing alone, is not sufficient for jurisdiction, unless the parties acted together or the defendant had derivative liability for the
conduct of the third party. 136 The Court then added that the plaintiffs could
not trace their Plavix to a particular distributor to demonstrate the necessary
connection. 137 While this latter basis for rejecting the plaintiffs' jurisdictional
argument would not impact those in situations similar to that Nicastro confronted, with a single U.S. distributor, what happens when the foreign manu-

133 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878-79 (2011) (plurality opinion); id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 894-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-13, Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (No.
09-1343)
(J. McIntyre's counsel arguing Nicastro's claim should have been brought in Ohio during skeptical questioning by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan).
135 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1783 (2017).
136 See id.
137 See id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument 33, Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)
(No. 16-466) (plaintiffs' counsel conceding before the Supreme Court that it was impossible to
track a particular pill to a particular distributor).
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facturer has several U.S. agents distributing a standardized product that
cannot be traced to a particular distributor?
Or what if Bristol-Myers is later read to impose a stand-alone requirement that a distributor's activities cannot be considered in ascertaining the
amenability of manufacturers in the absence of concerted action? Such an
interpretation would utterly upend jurisdiction over foreign product manufacturers. No evidence would typically exist that a manufacturer engaged in
relevant acts together with its distributor in its distributor's home state, nor
would a legal basis typically exist for holding the manufacturer derivatively
liable for its distributor's home-state conduct. If in-forum delivery of products to a third-party distributor is not a relevant specific jurisdiction contact
for a subsequent products liability suit, foreign manufacturers like J. McIntyre would be insulated from any claim in an American forum as long as
they used an independent U.S. distributor for their products.
And the uncertainties and injustices arising from the Court's new jurisdictional restrictions extend well beyond foreign manufacturers' liability and
other transnational disputes. 138 Returning to the BNSF scenario, could a
Montana truck driver, who was hired and employed by BNSF in Montana,
sue BNSF in Montana under the FELA if the driver was injured while temporarily working in another state? 139 Would the in-state residence, hiring, and
employment of the truck driver establish a sufficient connection to the injury
to authorize a Montana court to exercise specific jurisdiction over the claim,
or would the driver be relegated to suing BNSF in the state where the actual
injury occurred? The answer is now unclear after general jurisdiction's demise-BNSF maintained before the Montana Supreme Court that the driver
in such a situation would be unable to bring his action in the state where he
regularly resides and works due to the lack of the necessary connection between the forum and the injury, even though the FELA's purposes included
safeguarding injured workers from the injustice of pursuing claims in distant
locales. 140
Comparable uncertainties and injustices now routinely plague jurisdictional doctrine. Could a family sue in their home state for an injury suffered
in another state by the negligence of a Delaware corporation's employees in
138 Scholars have addressed the troubling potential ramifications of the Court's jurisdictional limitations in a myriad of transnational contexts. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Whose
Law of Personal Jurisdiction? The Choice of Law Problem in the Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1729 (2016) (recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments);
Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 643 (asset-freeze orders against
the customer accounts of foreign banks maintaining permanent U.S. branches); Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments and Awards:
What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344 (2016) (recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments); Aaron D. Simowitz, LegislatingTransnationalJurisdiction,57 VA. J. INT'L
L. 325 (2018) (Anti-Terrorism Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Skinner, supra
note 23 (federal transnational claims).
139 Cf Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Co., 373 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2016) (posing this hypothetical), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
140 See id. at
4.
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operating one of the company's ubiquitous national brand-name hotels? 141
How about suing at home for a slip-and-fall claim against Wal-Mart or
Home Depot while shopping on vacation in another state? 142 Can a worker
exposed to asbestos manufactured by a national corporation sue in his home
state when the corporation operates in-forum facilities and he first manifested an asbestos-related disease there, but his actual exposure to the corporation's asbestos-containing products occurred in another state? 143 All these
questions would have been answered affirmatively before the Roberts
Court's jurisdictional sextet, but now the answers, while not definitive, appear to be to the contrary. 144
Such decisions barring residents from maintaining suits in their home
states against out-of-state corporations conducting substantial in-state business operations aptly illustrate the disarray and inequity unleashed by the
Court's jurisdictional revolution. 145 The Supreme Court will soon be grappling directly with the appropriate causation standard in two recently granted
consolidated cases, both involving suits against Ford Motor Corporation by
forum residents injured in their home state in their used vehicles Ford originally sold in another state. 146 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of these
cases, however, an alternative jurisdictional approach is sorely needed to
restore the fairness and efficiency aspirations of the adversary system.

111.

AN

ALTERNATIVE: CONSENTING

TO THE EXERCISE OF STATE

AUTHORITY

Consent provides such an alternative jurisdictional avenue, operating
outside the due process minimum contacts analysis. 147 The Supreme Court
has long acknowledged that non-resident defendants can consent to personal
jurisdiction, which, when given in accordance with the Constitution, waives
other potential constitutional challenges to the state's adjudicative power. 148
141 See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 3, at 212-13 & n.7 (posing a similar hypothetical
based on earlier cases addressing the issue).
142 Cf Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 569 S.W.3d 865, 870-72
(Ark. 2019)
(holding Louisiana store near Arkansas border that targeted Arkansas consumers not amenable
to jurisdiction in Arkansas for resident's slip-and-fall claim).
143 Cf Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2018) (upholding jurisdictional dismissal of similar claim).
1" See, e.g., id. at 1310-11; Lawson, 569 S.W.3d at 870-72.
145 Cf Waite, 901 F.3d at 1310-11; Lawson, 569 S.W.3d
at 870-72.
146 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 395 Mont. 478 (Mont.
2019),
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 917 (2020); Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 932 N.W.2d 744 (Minn.
2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020).
147 See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988)
(distinguishing consensual jurisdiction under an appointment statute from the minimum contacts analysis); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (distinguishing contacts jurisdiction from consent jurisdiction).
148 E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-07 (1982); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856).
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The Court's decisions have recognized "a variety of legal arrangements" as
"represent[ing] express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of
the court." 149 One arrangement that historically has indicated at least a limited consent to jurisdiction is corporate registration and agent appointment
statutes.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment and Interpretationof Corporate Registration
Statutes

Corporate registration and appointment statutes first appeared in the
mid-nineteenth century in response to the initial common-law understanding
that a corporation had no existence outside its state of incorporation.1 0 This
common-law view at first prevented corporations from being amenable to
suit at all in the courts of another state.' To alleviate the injustice from a
corporation's avoidance of its obligations where they arose, states began to
require, as a statutory condition for the corporation to do business in the
state, that the corporation register with state authorities and appoint an agent
to accept service of process in cases related to its forum activities. 15 2
The Supreme Court first upheld service on an appointed agent under a
registration statute as an appropriate jurisdictional basis entitled to full faith
and credit in 1856, in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French.153 Lafayette Insurance, an Indiana corporation, executed an insurance contract in Ohio with
Ohio citizens to insure property in Ohio through its statutory Ohio resident
agent. 154 Under Ohio law, service of process on a resident insurance agent
bound an out-of-state insurer to appear for suits founded on its in-state insurance contracts with state citizens.155 Nevertheless, Lafayette did not appear
when its agent was served with the contract suit, allowing the insureds to
obtain a judgment in Ohio state court that the insureds then sought to execute in the federal circuit court for Indiana. 156 The Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit court's dismissal of Lafayette's full-faith-and-credit jurisdictional
challenge to the Ohio judgment, reasoning that, because Lafayette could
transact business in Ohio only with the authorization of the state, Ohio could
impose as a condition for that authorization that the agent accept service of
process in lawsuits founded on its contracts of insurance entered into in the

149

Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703.

150 E.g., Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 301, 314 (1841); Bank of

Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588-89 (1839). Of course, the Supreme Court subsequently discarded this common-law notion. See, e.g., Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co.,
96 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1878).
151 See, e.g., Peckham v. N. Par. in Haverhill, 16 Pick. 274, 275 (Mass. 1834); McQueen
v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
152 See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 354-55
(1882).
153 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
154 Id. at 406.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 404-06.
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state.15 7 Yet the decision was limited to situations in which the suits were
related to the business being conducted within the forum: "We limit our
decision to the case of a corporation acting in a State foreign to its creation,
under a law of that State which recognized its existence, for the purposes of
making contracts there and being sued on them, through notice to its con8
tracting agents."15

Subsequent nineteenth-century cases continued to describe the permissible corporate consent for the privilege of conducting business as limited to
actions related to the corporation's conduct of business within the forum. 159
As the corporate presence fiction developed, though, service on a statutory
agent became a jurisdictional basis in early twentieth-century cases to adjudicate claims unrelated to the corporation's activities within the state. 16 0 Yet
these cases were linked to the then-prevailing "presence" by "doing business" construct. 161 The Court was hesitant to predicate a defendant's amenability on serving a registered agent when the defendant no longer was
conducting business within the forum, several times construing state registration statutes as not encompassing such a questionable jurisdictional
reach. 162 Now that the Roberts Court has discarded general jurisdiction via a
defendant's "presence" in the state through conducting in-state business, 163
registration statutes might no longer be a permissible basis for all-encom-

151 Id. at 407. The Court viewed this as an exchange: "Now when this corporation
sent its
agents into Ohio, with authority to make contracts of insurance there, the corporation must be
taken to assent to the condition upon which alone such business could be there transacted by
them." Id. at 408.
158

Id. at 408-09.

See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (declaring corporation could be
required to "stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will
accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specifically designated"); Ex
parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 378 (1878) (noting a nonresident corporation "may, for the
purpose of securing business, consent to be 'found' away from home, for the purposes of suit
as to matters growing out of its transactions"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878)
(opining its holding did not preclude a state from requiring "a non-resident entering into a
partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint
an agent or representative in the State to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts"); Balt. & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 81 (1871) (stating a corporation could be required to
"consent to be sued" in a forum, with such assent presumed through conducting in-forum
business).
160 See, e.g., Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93,
94 (1917).
161 See Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 16,
at 437-40.
162 See, e.g., Chipman Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffrey Co., 252 U.S. 373, 379 (1920)
(leaving
open the constitutionality of all-encompassing jurisdiction over a corporation based on serving
its registered forum agent when the corporation was not doing business there); accord Morris
& Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1929) (construing state registration
statute as not conferring jurisdiction over registered corporations not actually conducting business within the state); Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 213,
216 (1921) (construing state registration statute similarly).
163 See supra Part II.A.
159
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passing general jurisdiction for claims arising anywhere in the world.M Yet
the Supreme Court has never indicated any hesitancy with upholding consent by registration when there is some even attenuated connection with the
forum state, as the defined articulation of an exchange of benefits and burdens has authorized adjudicative jurisdiction in situations where the relationship necessary for specific contacts jurisdiction may not otherwise have been
present.
Take Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters,165 which found
the necessary relationship with the forum under a consent statute for an injury suffered outside the forum solely because the plaintiff purchased his
railroad ticket from another entity in the forum. 166 Chatters was injured when
a train window broke and he was hit with flying glass while the train was
being operated by the Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, in
Virginia. 167 Chatters had purchased his ticket for his journey in New Orleans
from the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a Kentucky corporation,
which operated the train from New Orleans to Alabama. Chatters sued both
Southern and Louisville & Nashville in Louisiana, but Southern asserted
that, under Louisiana state law, its appointment of an agent constituted a
consent to suit only upon causes of action arising out of business conducted
within the state. 168 Southern continued that, since the accident occurred in
Virginia, and the ticket was sold in Louisiana by another entity (Louisville
Nashville), an adequate relationship did not exist between Southern's business in Louisiana and Chatters' claim. While accepting the argument that
state law required a relationship between the corporation's forum business
and the claim, the Supreme Court held that Southern was amenable to jurisdiction in Louisiana. 169 The Court concluded that the obligation to Chatters
predicated on the contract of transportation was incurred within Louisiana
and, even though the contract was not executed by Southern, the obligation
was accepted by Southern after being executed by an agent. 170 This established that the subsequent injury in Virginia was sufficiently connected to
Southern's forum business to comport with the consent statute. 171 The Court
was unwilling to construe the relationship requirement for a consent statute
narrowly when Southern conducted activities within the forum state and appointed a designated agent for service of process. 172

1" See Monestier, supra note 22, at 1346; Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 16, at
442-44.
165 279 U.S. 320 (1929).
166
Id. at 329.
167 Id. at 323.
168 Id. at 325-26.
169 Id.
170
Id. at 327.
171 Id. at 327-29.
172 Id.
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The same principle could also explain the Supreme Court's implicit
1 73
suggestion in Shaffer v. Heitner
that Delaware could enact a consent statute deeming the acceptance of a Delaware corporate directorship as a consent to jurisdiction for claims related to the director's duties. 174 Although the
Supreme Court held in Shaffer that a directorship alone did not establish the
propriety of specific jurisdiction, the Court distinguished the situation from
the expectations arising under statutes in other states requiring directors to
consent to jurisdiction for suits related to their corporate duties.17 5 This distinction has led the lower courts to uphold such consent statutes, including
the one adopted by Delaware immediately after the Shaffer decision, even
though a consent statute does not change the director's contacts with the
forum state. 176 Yet because a state's corporate law creates benefits regarding
the status, authority, and privileges of directors, these benefits may be exchanged for the directors' promise of amenability for causes of action arising
from or related to their duties.17 7 Such an appropriate bargain, where the state
has the authority to establish the parameters of directors' powers and obligations, should authorize an expanded jurisdictional reach, as long as the state
does not exceed its legitimate regulatory authority. Although a directorship
alone cannot establish the propriety of contacts jurisdiction in the forum
when the conduct giving rise to the litigation arose elsewhere under Shaffer,
a consent statute may change the analysis through the exchange of state benefits for guaranteed amenability for claims related to directors' corporate
8

obligations.17

The single potential constitutional concern that has been raised by
scholars concerning the consent statute Delaware adopted in response to
Shaffer is that it "deems" the consent through the director's activity (that is,
accepting the directorship), irrespective of the director's knowledge of the
obligation. 179 The Supreme Court has largely abandoned its prior view that a
state can rest adjudicative power on an implied, fictional consent arising

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Id. at 216 ("Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State.").
175 See id.
176 E.g., Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147,
157-58
(3d Cir. 2010); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-73 (D.
Md. 1981); Stearn v. Malloy, 89 F.R.D. 421, 423-24 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Prods., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 745, 748 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Gansler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d
695, 704-09 (Del. 2009); Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176-80 (Del. 1980); Swenson v. Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279, 290 (N.C. App. 1978).
177 See Armstrong, 423 A.2d at 176-77.
178 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
216.
179 See Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond
Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783, 813 (2013) (urging Supreme Court precedent "made it perfectly
clear that predicating personal jurisdiction upon 'implied consent' was both ineffective and
unhelpful"); Verity Winship, Jurisdictionover Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (arguing implied consent is an insufficient
basis for personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate officers).
173
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solely from the nonresident's activities. 8 0 Yet, as these objecting scholars
have proposed, the conceptual difficulty with implied consent can be readily
avoided by moving to a recognized form of actual consent, which would
ensure that corporate directors had legally sufficient notice of the exchange
of their jurisdictional amenability for the legal benefits received from the
state."1

B.

The Constitutionality of Explicit Registration Conditions

The exchange of obligations and benefits when nonresident corporations are required to register and obtain a certificate of authority to do business in a state likewise supports that state imposing explicit jurisdictional
consequences as part of the bargain. Corporations are artificial entities that
depend on legal recognition, first springing into existence via filing articles
of incorporation and obtaining a certificate of incorporation from a sovereign authority. 18 2 Thus, a "corporation ... owes its existence and attributes
to state law,"183 as a sovereign must give its permission as a regulatory precondition for a corporation to conduct its operations. 18 4 Corporations are not
"citizens" for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, having no protection against the state denial of those benefits and privileges protected by that clause, including the right to maintain an action in the
courts of another state or the right to conduct ongoing local, in-state business
activities. 1 5
Every state statutorily requires out-of-state corporations transacting instate business to register with and obtain a certificate of authority from a

"'See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
F. 141, 169 (noting the Supreme Court abandoned "wholly fictional notions of
'implied' and 'hypothetical consent' . . . after a century or so of experimenting with it");
Wendy Collins Purdue, PersonalJurisdictionand the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529,
537-44 (1991) (discussing the difficulties with implicit consent as a jurisdictional
justification).
181 See Chiappinelli, supra note 179, at 836; Winship, supra note 179, at 1199. Professor
Chiappinelli's article proposed a tailored statutory fix to amend Delaware's annual reporting
requirements to necessitate a separate signed consent to personal jurisdiction from each director and officer. Chiappinelli, supra note 179, at 836.
182 See 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORACHI. LEGAL

TIONS

129, 137-46, 166 (2010).

183

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).

184 Id.; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspec-

tives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1503 (1989).
185 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 443-44
(1931) (upholding Virginia statute precluding nonresident corporations from exercising powers and intrastate
business activities of a public service corporation); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-51
(1928) (holding out-of-state commercial investment trust conducting in-state negotiable notes
business could not rely upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause to maintain a breach of
contract action in Michigan state court that had been dismissed for the trust's failure to obtain a
certificate of authority); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 275-78 (1927) (holding out-of-state insurance company could not sue in state court to enforce insurance contract
without complying with state licensing requirements).
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designated official in order to do business in the state. 18 6 Without obtaining
the required authorization, a nonresident corporation is barred from accessing the state's judicial system under all or almost all these registration statutes, with many states also imposing fines and other penalties, including the
restraint of further intrastate business transactions, for the failure to comply. 187 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of
both these registration and authorization statutes and their associated consequences for noncompliant nonresident corporations conducting local, intrastate business activities, although such cases largely pre-date the Roberts
Court's recent personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.'
Not all corporate business transactions, though, can constitutionally
trigger a registration responsibility. The dormant commerce clause prohibits
states from placing an undue burden on interstate commerce, thereby barring
state-compelled registration or the accompanying burdens on out-of-state
corporations solely engaged in interstate business with state citizens and not
conducting local business operations within the state.189 Thus, for example,
the Supreme Court held in Davis v. Farmers'Co-op Equity Co. 190 that a state
statute authorizing jurisdiction over any railroad based on an in-state agent
soliciting interstate traffic for its out-of-state railroad lines violated the dormant commerce clause when applied to "a suit in a state in which the cause
See Monestier, supra note 22, at 1363-66.
See id. For some examples of state statutes authorizing injunctive relief to preclude
further corporate intrastate activity for failure to obtain the required certificate of authority, see
ALA. CODE §§ 1OA-1-7.22-.23 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1502 (2020); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-27-1502 (2020); COLo. REV. STAT. § 7-90-802 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-921
(2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 378-84 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:13-11-12 (2019);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1303 (McKinney 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-1OA-1502 (2020).
188 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 278-83 (1961) (affirming dismissal of nonresident corporation's state court complaint for its failure to obtain a
certificate of authority when it was conducting some intrastate business through a forum office); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 206-12 (1944) (affirming dismissal of
nonresident's state court complaint for its failure to obtain a certificate of authority when it was
conducting localized in-state business in furtherance of its import-export brokerage business);
Bothwell, 275 U.S. at 275-78 (affirming dismissal of nonresident insurance corporation's
breach of contract suit for failing to comply with state licensing requirements).
189 See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 29-34 (1974) (holding dismissal of nonresident cotton merchant's state court suit for breach of contract due to its failure to
qualify to do business violated the Commerce Clause as the merchant's state contacts did not
establish the necessary "localization or intrastate character" for compelled state registration);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-93 (1921) (holding nonresident
milling company's breach of contract action for the interstate sale and delivery of wheat could
be maintained in state court despite its failure to register for in-state business because registration requirement could not be applied to a transaction in interstate commerce without violating
the Commerce Clause); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1914) (reversing
dismissal, for failing to comply with registration statute, of a state court action brought by
nonresident corporation to recover on a contractual transaction in interstate commerce); Int'l
Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 110-12 (1910) (holding statutory condition that out-ofstate corporation conducting interstate business submit a statement of its financial condition
and a listing of all its directors, officers, and trustees unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce).
190 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
186

18'
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of action did not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not
entered upon, in which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and
in which the plaintiff does not reside."191 The railroad, a Kansas corporation,
had entered into a contract with another Kansas corporation to ship grain
within Kansas over its railroad line, yet the plaintiff sued the railroad in
Minnesota, relying entirely on the Minnesota statute that compelled interstate carriers to submit to suit there as a condition of maintaining an agent to
solicit out-of-state freight and passenger traffic. 19 2 Yet because such solicitation was "a recognized part of the business of interstate transportation," the
Court reasoned the Minnesota statutory condition requiring a general submission to suit to conduct interstate business imposed "a serious and unreasonable burden" on interstate commerce, rendering the statute "obnoxious
to the commerce clause."193 The linchpin to invalidating this statutory jurisdictional condition, then, was the exclusively interstate nature of the company's business, without any local activity recognized as the regular conduct
of intrastate business.
To ensure compliance with this dormant commerce clause limitation,
corporate registration statutes explicitly limit their application to those nonresident corporations that "transact business" in the state, which is typically
statutorily defined by excluding those in-state activities that are not sufficient to transact business (such as interstate business activities, isolated instate transactions, or mere solicitations). 19 4 Only those corporations engaging
in an ongoing and regular course of intrastate or local business activity are
required to register and obtain a certificate of authority, as such corporations
are conducting activities comparable to a local business enterprise.195 These
191 Id. at 317.
192

193

Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 315-17.

194 See generally CSC GLOBAL, GUIDE To DOING BUSINESS

OUTSIDE YOUR STATE: THE

CSC 50-STATE QUALIFICATION HANDBOOK (2018). The Model Business Corporation Act lists
the following activities as insufficient for transacting in-state business: conducting isolated instate transactions, transacting interstate business, soliciting orders, selling through independent
contractors, owning property or bank accounts, collecting debts, participating in litigation, creating or acquiring indebtedness, holding certain meetings, and maintaining offices for the
transfer of securities. See id. Most states have adopted these exclusions in whole or in substantial part, although there are variations. See id.
195 See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 29-34 (1974) (holding compelled state registration impermissible without the requisite "localization or intrastate character" of business activities); Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 736 (2d
Cir. 1983) (summarizing New York cases as requiring the intrastate activity to be "permanent,
continuous, and regular" to impose a registration requirement, necessitating that some activities subjecting the nonresident to adjudicative jurisdiction will not constitute transacting business); Charter Fin. Co. v. Henderson, 326 N.E.2d 372, 375 (Ill. 1975) (holding isolated
business transactions within the state insufficient to trigger registration duty); Yangming
Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon Prods. U.S.A., Inc., 536 A.2d 633, 636 (Md. 1988) (holding
unqualified corporation can only be barred from suing in Maryland courts if corporation is
engaging in "such a substantial amount of localized business in this State that the corporation
could be deemed 'present,'" requiring a "significantly greater amount of local activity" than
the minimum for personal jurisdiction); Long Mfg. Co. v. Wright-Way Farm Serv., Inc., 214
N.W.2d 816, 818-20 (Mich. 1974) (holding a nonresident corporation's isolated or indepen-
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local, ongoing activities implicate the regulatory authority of the state to
attach conditions on the terms under which the nonresident corporation operates within the state. 19 6 In other words, in exchange for the state's permission
to conduct such local activities, the corporation can be obligated to accept
proportional state-imposed qualifications, as a state is generally free to enact
reasonable conditions on those state-conferred benefits that the Constitution
allows to be withheld.
In light of the Supreme Court's revolutionary restrictions on state adjudicative authority discussed in Part II, states should reassert their authority to
adjudicate claims related to their sovereign interests through attaching reasonable qualifications on corporate privileges in using state courts and conducting local intrastate business operations. Our proposal suggests
accomplishing this through an explicit, defined-consent corporate registration scheme. The proposal requires, as a condition for the corporation to
obtain or maintain a certificate of authority to do business in the state, the
corporation's consent to suit in defined circumstances that implicate state
sovereign interests, including situations where (1) the suit arises from an
injury suffered in the state, (2) the suit is brought by a state resident, (3) the
suit is governed by that state's law, or (4) the suit is to enforce a judgment or
remedial order against persons or property within the state.
IV.

A

PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINED-CONSENT REGISTRATION SCHEME

Although states could act unilaterally to define the scope of their registration acts, the Uniform Law Commission is especially well positioned to
recommend a draft act. The ULC, founded in 1892, is a nonpartisan organization composed of commissioners from all fifty states and several U.S. territories, many of whom have legislative experience. 197 The ULC proposes
legislation in areas where states have the primary regulatory authority, but
where state uniformity is necessary or desirable. 198 Those acts are then made
available to the states, becoming effective only when adopted by state
legislatures.
To date, the ULC has produced more than 300 different acts. 199 Perhaps
the best-known ULC project is the Uniform Commercial Code, which has
been adopted in all fifty states and has created an efficient and reliable set of
dent intrastate activities, even if sufficient to establish adjudicative jurisdiction, do not suffice
to compel its registration, as an intent to carry on the ongoing corporate business in the state is

necessary); Highfill, Inc. v. Bruce & Iris, Inc., 855 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636-38 (App. Div. 2008)
(dismissing contract claims of Louisiana corporation doing regular in-state business in New
York for failing to register because it was engaging in a systematic, continuous, and regular
course of intrastate business essential to its overall operations).
196 See supra notes 173-85.
197 ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION:
LAW COMMISSION 1 (2013); Overview, UNIFORM LAW COMM'N,

aboutulc/overview
198 STEIN,

[https://perma.cc/LQ6J-YVXP].

supra note 197, at 236.

199 UNIFORM LAW COMMN, supra note 197.

A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM
http://www.uniformlaws.org/
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rules for commercial transactions. 200 Other well-known acts emanating from
the ULC include the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Model Registered
Agents Act.201
The ULC develops two different types of acts. "Uniform" acts are
aimed at "establish[ing] the same law on a subject among the various jurisdictions." 202 In cases where absolute uniformity is not needed, "model" acts
are intended to enable state variations; these acts "promote uniformity and
minimize diversity even though a significant number of jurisdictions may
not adopt the act in its entirety." 203 For the reasons discussed below, we
believe that an act specifying the jurisdictional consequences of corporate
registration would be best structured as a model act, allowing states to
choose the provisions best suited to their own needs.
A.

The Need for a Clarified JurisdictionalReach

An essential aspect of the proposed act is providing corporations explicit notice as to the jurisdictional consequences of registering to do business in the forum. Since registration and agent appointment statutes were
promulgated in the nineteenth century, questions of statutory interpretation
regarding the extent of the consent granted and any constitutional limitations
on obtaining such a consent have been recurring issues. 204 In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court, along with lower courts, struggled with
whether service on a registered or corporate agent, standing alone, could
support all-purpose jurisdictional authority for a claim arising anywhere in
the world. 205 But as the judiciary solidified the former "continuous and systematic" standard for general jurisdiction, the need to interpret registration
statutes diminished-after all, registering to do business in a state usually
accompanied the requisite continuous and systematic contacts for "doing
business" general jurisdiction (because otherwise the state could not compel
registration under the Commerce Clause). 206 Thus, the need to interpret the
jurisdictional effect of business registration largely faded away.

200

Id.

201 Find an Act,

UNIFORM LAW COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/findact
[https://perma.ccI3HSX-P5KQ].
202 What Is a Uniform Act?, UNIFORM LAW COMMN, https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/
overview/uniformacts [https://perma.cc/Q6JL-LRDH].
203 What Is a Model Act?, UNIFORM LAW COMMN, https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/
overview/modelacts [https://perma.cc/97TR-3U5V].
204 See supra Part III.
205 See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers' Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1923)
(holding
Commerce Clause barred states from compelling interstate carriers to generally submit to all
suits through a solicitation agent); Chipman Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffrey Co., 252 U.S. 373, 379
(1920) (leaving open the constitutionality of all-encompassing jurisdiction over a corporation
based on serving its registered forum agent when the corporation was not doing business
there).
206 See supra Parts II, III.
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Now, with the demise of "continuous and systematic" general "doing
business" jurisdiction, the meaning of these registration statutes gains renewed urgency. In general, the states have adopted broad statutory conceptions of the permissible bounds of their jurisdictional reach in their long-arm
statutes in order to protect their citizens, provide an available forum for redress, resolve cases implicating their regulatory power, and cooperate with
other states to obtain efficient resolution of controversies. In approximately
thirty states, the long-arm jurisdictional power extends as far as constitutional due process will allow. 2 0 7 Other state long-arm statutes either contain
explicit provisions or were (before Daimler) interpreted as authorizing general jurisdiction in cases where the defendant was "doing business" within
the state. 208 Few, if any, states have such narrow long-arm provisions that the
demise of general jurisdiction leaves no jurisdictional void.
As a result, the question that was previously avoidable-that is, what is
the jurisdictional effect of registering to do business and appointing an agent
for in-state service of process?-must now be answered in nearly every
state. 209 But at the present time, significant uncertainty remains regarding the
interpretation of most states' registration statutes. A 2015 post-Daimler survey of state practices found that thirty-two states had not then "clarified the
jurisdictional consequences of their registration statutes." 210 Another nine at
that time had either decided or suggested that registration can give rise to
general jurisdiction-though these states (as the Delaware Supreme Court
recently did211) Will likely need to revisit their holdings in light of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence.
This pending jurisdictional interpretive question can be resolved by two
separate institutions. First, the question can be addressed by the judiciary
when a plaintiff sues a defendant who was registered to do business in the
state for a cause of action arising outside the state. Since the Daimler decision, this issue has been frequently arising in litigation pending in state and

COX, supra note 20, § 4.01.
See Gonzalez v. Internacional de Elevadores, S.A., 891 A.2d 227, 233 (D.C. 2006)
(holding general jurisdiction could be based on a "consistent pattern of regular business activity" within the state (quoting AMAF International Corp. v. Ralston Purina Co., 428 A.2d 849,
850 (D.C. 1981))); MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d
627, 631 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that general jurisdiction could be based on "continuous and substantial" in-state business).
209 Cf State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Mo. 1999) (holding
that the court need not decide whether the appointment of a registered agent "is always sufficient to confer jurisdiction" because general jurisdiction could be obtained over any defendant
"conducting substantial and continuous business" within the state).
210 Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer's Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and General
JurisdictionAfter Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1647 (2015). A few state
supreme courts, including the high courts in Illinois, Missouri, Oregon, and Wisconsin, have
since provided clarification. See infra note 212.
211 See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 126-28 (Del. 2016) (overruling, in
light of Daimler, earlier precedent holding that in-state registration could establish general
jurisdiction).
207 CASAD, RICHMAN &
208
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federal courts. 212 Second, the interpretation question could be set to rest with
an explicit jurisdictional pronouncement by the state legislature. Of course,
in the absence of legislation, most states will eventually answer the question
through litigation. Nonetheless, the litigation process is typically expensive
and time consuming, and multiple cases may raise the issue in a single forum before the matter is resolved. 213 Moreover, even if the matter is resolved
by the state's highest court, the court's decision is still only an interpretation
of a legislative act-if the legislature disagrees with that interpretation, it
may decide to amend the statute in any case.
Adopting an explicit defined-consent statute allows a state to avoid the
perilous terrain of constitutional, statutory, and administrative regulations
governing forum selection. Pre-suit express consent is an easy-to-administer
and precise mechanism to establish the propriety of an adjudicative proceeding in a particular forum. By specifying an agreement in advance, the parties
avoid a shifting and unstable jurisdictional doctrine that has engendered uncertainty and injustices regarding permissible locales for adjudication.
B.

The Model CorporateRegistration JurisdictionalConsent Act

Given the inefficiency of litigating the same question in over half the
states, and the ultimate responsibility of the legislature to statutorily define
the jurisdictional reach of the state courts, we conclude that legislation is
212 For a sampling of post-Daimler published appellate court decisions
addressing this
issue, see Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1318-22 (11th Cir. 2018) (interpreting Florida registration statute as not operating as a consent to general jurisdiction); Gulf Coast
Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, L.L.C., 717 F. App'x 394, 397-98 (5th Cir.
2017) (interpreting the Louisiana registration statute as not operating as a consent to general
jurisdiction); AM Trust v. UBS AG, 681 F. App'x 587, 588-89 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the
California statute similarly); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640-41 (2d Cir.
2016) (construing Connecticut's registration statute as not requiring registering corporations to
submit to general jurisdiction in the absence of a definitive state interpretation and in light of
constitutional concerns); Cepec, 137 A.3d at 126-28 (overruling earlier Delaware precedent
that in-state registration could establish general jurisdiction); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Interstate
Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 446-48 (Ill. 2017) (interpreting Illinois registration statute
as not establishing a consent to general jurisdiction); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41,
52 (Mo. 2017) (interpreting Missouri's registration statute as not providing for a corporation's
amenability for suits unrelated to the corporation's forum activities); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
426 P.3d 1, 9 (Mont. 2018) (interpreting Montana registration statute in light of due process
concerns to hold registration does not give rise to general jurisdiction); Rodriguez v. Ford
Motor Co., No. A-1-CA-36402, 2018 WL 6716038, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018)
(holding that registration to do business in New Mexico continues to operate as a constitutionally valid consent to jurisdiction within the state); Figueroa v. BNSF Ry. Co., 390 P.3d 1019,
1030 (Or. 2017) (interpreting Oregon registration statute as not operating as a consent to general jurisdiction); Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 76-83 (Wis. 2017) (interpreting Wisconsin registration statute as
not operating as a consent to general jurisdiction under statutory interpretation canons, including constitutional avoidance).
213 See David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessonsfrom Qui Tam
Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1913, 1925-26 (2014) (observing that "[p]rivate enforcement's decentralized and unyielding nature likewise exacts an efficiency toll by inviting duplicative enforcement actions").
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warranted. And given that the question is largely the same in each statethat is, what is the effect of registering to do business and appointing an instate agent for service of process?-we believe that the most efficient process of adopting that legislation may be to work through the Uniform Law
Commission.
This would not be the first time that the ULC has addressed jurisdictional issues. In 1962, it adopted the "Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act," which included a proposed long-arm statute "of moderate
reach." 214 A jurisdictional-consent act could update, modernize, and standardize that earlier work. We propose the following act as a starting point:
MODEL

CORPORATE

REGISTRATION

JURISDICTIONAL

CONSENT

ACT

Section 1. CONSENT TO JURISDICTION. 180 days after the effective
date of this Act, unless the corporation has otherwise agreed with the
claimant or claimants to the exclusivity of another forum, a corporation's application for authority or registration to do business in this
state, whenever filed, encompasses a consent to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state once service is made upon the corporation's registered agent (or, if there is none, upon the Secretary of State), if each
claimant independently maintains or alleges one of the following suits,
claims, or causes of action:
(1) A claim that is based in whole or in part on any business
or operations of the corporation conducted within this state,
including providing or delivering a good or service within this
state to a distributor, manufacturer, independent contractor,
consumer, or other party when the provided good or service
then causes harm either in this state or another state;
(2) A suit sounding in contract or tort brought by
(a) an individual domiciled in this state at the time his or
her claims accrued;
(b) a corporation either incorporated in this state or having a principal place of business in this state at the
time its claims accrued; or
(c) a non-incorporated association, partnership, or venture with a principal place of business in this state at
the time its claims accrued;
(3) A claim that will be governed by this state's statutory or
common law under applicable choice-of-law principles;
(4) A suit seeking redress for any injury or portion of an injury, whether sounding in contract or tort, suffered within this
state;
214

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra

note 20, § 1068.
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(5) A suit brought against the corporation and one or more
other defendants when:
(a) one of the other defendants is subject to general jurisdiction in this state; and
(b) the claims against the defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments resulting from separate proceedings;
(6) A suit to enforce a judgment subject to recognition in the
state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a treaty or other
international agreement, or comity principles against the corporation's property or assets located within the state; or
(7) A suit to confirm an award made pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for
the United States that calls for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
Section 2. TERMINATION OF CONSENT TO JURISDICTION. A corporation's consent to jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1 terminates for the corporation's future acts,
transactions, or omissions on the date it obtains a certificate of
withdrawal or otherwise properly revokes its authorization or
registration to do business. The withdrawal or revocation shall
not affect jurisdiction over any claims based in whole or in
part on any act, transaction, or omission occurring while the
corporation was authorized or registered to do business in this
state, unless the corporation declines to grant any consent to
jurisdiction under this Act by withdrawing or revoking its authorization or registration to do business within the 180-day
period after the Act's effective date.
Section 3. NOTICE. Upon the effective date of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall provide a copy of this Act to each corporation authorized or registered to do business in this state
by mail directed to the corporation's registered agent (or, if
there is none, to the secretary of the corporation at its principal office shown in its most recent filing with the state). The
Secretary of State shall also furnish a copy of this Act to each
corporation that applies for authority or registers to do business in this state after the effective date of this Act.
Section 4. SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this Act are
severable, such that in the event a court invalidates any provision, the remainder of the provisions shall remain in effect.
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The various components of the proposed Model Act are intended to
protect the state's sovereign protective, regulatory, and prescriptive interests
in cases involving state residents, state law, or property within the state. The
Model Act applies to those corporations that have taken the affirmative step
of applying for authority or registering to do business within the state (which
is only necessary if the corporation is conducting, or is planning to conduct
soon, an ongoing and regular course of intrastate or local business activity 2 15 )-in the language of personal jurisdiction, each one has thus "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State." 216 Although a plaintiff's claim may not necessarily arise out of
those activities, the proposal's limitations ensure that any case brought under
the Act would at least pertain to sovereign state interests authorizing the
legitimate exercise of adjudicative power over the specified activities of registered businesses. 217
Paragraphs (1), (4), and (6) in Section 1 of the proposed Model Act
protect various facets of the state's regulatory authority. Paragraph (1)
targets business activities that take place in the state, even if those activities
end up causing harm outside the state, and paragraph (4) focuses on the
reverse, covering in-state injuries caused by out-of-state activity. Paragraph
(6) protects the state's authority over in-state property and provides a mechanism for interstate cooperation in giving teeth to the Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Section 1's remaining paragraphs address additional state interests. Paragraph (2) protects in-state residents, ensuring that they have a convenient
forum to seek recompense for injuries incurred outside the state. Paragraph
(3) allows state courts to hear claims arising under that state's law, thus protecting the state's ability to enforce and interpret its own laws. Although the
Act otherwise is not a joinder device, paragraph (5) allows sufficiently related multiparty cases to be filed in the home state of one of the defendants,
ensuring the availability of a forum capable of resolving the claims in a
single lawsuit-thereby authorizing plaintiffs to aggregate small-value
claims, permitting claims against multiple defendants to be litigated efficiently, and reducing the risk of inconsistent verdicts that would arise from a
multiplicity of suits. 2 18 Paragraph (7) protects the enforcement of valid arbi-

tral awards, an issue that has been open to question post-Daimler.219
215 See supra Part III.
216

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1785 (2017).

217 See infra Part V for more detail on the constitutionality of the state's exercise of
authority.
218 See Dodson, supra note 15, at 45 (explaining "[t]he Supreme Court's recent decisions
narrowing both specific and general jurisdiction hinder the joinder of claims, parties, and cases
in ways that reduce the fairness and efficiency of litigation").
219 See Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 138, at 381 ("The imposition of Daimler's
general jurisdiction test on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards presents significant
practical problems."). This is especially true when defendants move assets around the world in
an attempt to avoid the enforcement of an arbitration award or other judgment. Id.; see also

A New State RegistrationAct

2020]

415

Taken together, these provisions bridge the key jurisdictional gaps left
open after the Supreme Court's recent sextet of cases eviscerating general
jurisdiction and further limiting specific jurisdiction. The proposed provisions do not, however, extend nearly as far as general jurisdiction did before
the at-home trilogy. Instead, the proposed Model Act tackles the shortcomings of the new scope of adjudicative jurisdiction only in those areas where
the state has a legitimate interest in regulating in-state activity or protecting
in-state residents. 220 The proposed provisions thus seek to ensure that the
Roberts Court's newfound jurisdictional limitations do not bar effective
court access. 221
Although the provisions together fill the most important gaps left open
after the demise of general jurisdiction, they need not be taken together as a
package. That is, states could reasonably pick and choose among the provisions, adopting only the ones that best fit each state's needs. Thus, for example, a state may emphasize the need to provide a remedy to either its
residents or visitors injured inside the state; if so, the legislature might prioritize paragraphs (2) and (4). Another state, however, might want to commit to commercial efficiency, and so might reasonably choose to prioritize
paragraphs (6) and (7), ensuring that both arbitration agreements and sisterstate judgments could be easily enforced within the forum. For this reason,
we recommend a model statute that states could adapt to their own needs,
rather than a uniform act identical in every state. The heart of our proposal is
that corporations should have explicit notice of the claims covered by their
submission when registering or applying to do business; those claims need
not be the same in every state.
C.

The Benefits of the Uniform Law Process

A state wishing to avoid the uncertainty of litigation over the scope of
jurisdictional consent, or desiring an expedient cure to the injustices unleashed by the Roberts Court's jurisdictional onslaught, may wish to enact
quickly a statutory solution similar to the one we have proposed. Yet significant structural and resource advantages are available through the Uniform
Law Commission process. The ULC is designed to promote national uniformity while still deferring to state regulatory authority-and this structure
is particularly well-suited for questions of personal jurisdiction through corChevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, [2015] S.C.R. 69, para. 56-57 (Can.) (writing "[i]n today's
globalized world and electronic age," forcing a judgment creditor to "wait until the foreign
debtor is present or has assets in the province before a court can find that it has jurisdiction in
recognition and enforcement proceedings would be to turn a blind eye to current economic
reality").
220 See infra Part V (discussing the relevant state interests).
221 See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 10, at 549 (pointing out that the Court's
recent jurisdictional jurisprudence has "failed to adequately consider the sovereign interests of states and
has devalued plaintiffs' need for access to courts at the same time that it has arguably overvalued the defendant's interest in avoiding litigation in particular forums").
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porate registration. Indeed, some observers have argued the ULC is most
effective when tackling procedural matters. 222
An act defining the jurisdictional consequences of corporate registration would work ideally with cooperation among the states. After all, the
creation and regulation of corporate entities occurs primarily at the state
level. 2 23 And adjudicative power also necessitates state authority, most often
through state long-arm statutes.224 But even though the state interests may be
paramount, significant national interests are also presented. Corporate registration statutes, by their very nature, govern multistate businesses-that is,
businesses incorporated outside the state, but doing business in more than
one state. 225
Today, this combination of state authority and interstate cooperation is
often referred to as "horizontal federalism." 226 Most personal jurisdiction
problems today involve aspects of horizontal federalism, raising questions
regarding whether the exercise of jurisdiction by one state impermissibly
burdens residents of other states or infringes on other states' regulatory authority. 2 2 7 Although the ULC was founded more than a century before the
"horizontal federalism" label came into vogue, navigating the waters of horizontal federalism is what it does. Its mission-from its inception until today-is both to "promote uniformity of law among the states" and "to
support and protect the federal system of government by seeking an appropriate balance between federal and state law." 228
The ULC is uniquely positioned to encourage cooperation in developing legislative solutions to problems involving interstate relations. 229 Commissioners, who are required to be members of a state bar, are appointed

&

222 See Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 819 (2007)
(suggesting the ULC should "limit its aspiration to seeking procedural and transactional efficiencies," and arguing for the adoption of uniform choice-of-law principles).
223 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) ("[T]he corporation . . . owes its existence and attributes to state law.").
224 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1068.
225 Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Business
registration statutes . . . were enacted primarily to allow states to exercise jurisdiction over corporations that, although not formed under its laws, were transacting business within a state's
borders and thus potentially giving rise to state citizens' claims against them.").
226 Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 62 (2010) ("Typically, the
Constitution endows all fifty states with a certain power and thus creates a scenario where each
state might exercise its power in a manner that burdens other states or citizens of other states,
which in turn requires a rule explaining how the existence of multiple states with equivalent
powers limits the authority of each."); Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal JurisdictionDoctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 769, 772 (2015) [hereinafter Erbsen, HorizontalFederalism] (arguing "principles of horizontal federalism which govern relationships between states in a federal system can help courts allocate jurisdictional authority among potential fora").
227 Erbsen, HorizontalFederalism, supra note 226, at 772.
228 Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreward, in STEIN, supra note 197, at x-xi.
229 Edward J. Janger, PredictingWhen the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 592 (1998) ("The need to obtain
uniform adoption will encourage the drafters to enact a statute that is widely acceptable and
may effectuate a race to the top.").
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from all U.S. states and territories (typically by state governors), 23 0 and thus
in the aggregate mirror the political spectrum across the United States. The
ULC's vetting process has been fine-tuned over more than a century and,
unlike that of some private legislative reform groups, is highly transparent,
with outside observers and interested third parties invited to observe the proceedings and offer comments and suggestions as a model act is developed by
a subset of commissioners. 23 1 After a proposal is drafted, it is discussed and
debated by the ULC's entire membership of nearly 400 commissioners. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who served as a ULC commissioner
for six years (and served on the U.S. Supreme Court for thirty-three years),
described the "high quality" of the ULC floor debate, recalling that he had
"seen many deliberative bodies before and since, but in none were the discussions of the same high quality." 23 2
The transparency and vitality of the ULC process would allow interested parties to offer feedback on the proposed Act. Thus, corporations registered in more than one state could discuss the likely impact of such a
statute on their choice about where to do business-an easier process than
trying to educate fifty different state legislatures, and a less onerous burden
than filing amicus briefs in every case attempting to interpret a longstanding
registration statute. Lawyers representing both plaintiffs and defendants in
such cases could also be heard, allowing information to be collected about
how the current personal jurisdiction regime affects court access in cases
that span state or national boundaries. The availability of such information
means that the ULC could vet a model jurisdictional consent act more efficiently than fifty-plus individual legislative bodies. Taking this approach
would ensure that businesses have an opportunity for input and allows the
states to take a deliberative approach.
V.

THE SOVEREIGN STATE INTERESTS IN DEFINING JURISDICTIONAL
CONSENT BY CORPORATE REGISTRATION

A statutory enactment defining the scope of jurisdictional consent

through corporate registration holds some value regardless of its content.
Any such statute would establish a level of clarity and predictability in a
field thrown into confusion after the elimination of the "continuous and sys-

tematic" test for general jurisdiction. 23 3 More than half the states currently
230 FAQs, UNIFORM
perma.cc/24FW-7B7Q].

LAW

COMMN,

http://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq

[https://

231 The American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC"), for example, has been criticized for its relative lack of transparency. Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How ConservativeBacked State Laws Are All Connected, ATLANTIC
(Apr.
14,
2012), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-how-conservative-backed-statelaws-are-all-connected/255869/ [https://perma.cc/298V-WY39].
232 O'Connor, supra note 228, at x.
233 See supra Part IVA; see also Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courtsfor? Have We For-

saken the ProceduralGold Standard?, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 750 (2018) ("At a minimum, the
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lack a clear position on the jurisdictional effect of their registration schemes,
and other states have adopted broad conceptions of implied consent that may
be subject to constitutional challenge in the wake of Daimler.23 4 Given this
state of disorder, adopting almost any rule would at least avoid the need for
jurisdictional litigation in a regime of uncertainty.
Our proposed Model Act has substantive benefits beyond this added
clarity and predictability, however. Its provisions bridge the key jurisdictional gaps created by the Supreme Court's recent jurisdictional revolution,
while still working within the Supreme Court's pronounced adjudicative
framework in three interrelated ways. First, the proposal focuses tightly on
the forum state's sovereign interests that support a state's paramount claim to
exercise its regulatory power, thereby avoiding interference with the authority of other sovereigns while still ensuring that the newly announced limitations on contacts jurisdiction do not operate to bar effective court access. 2 3 5
Second, by creating an explicit mechanism to obtain consent for jurisdiction-and by ensuring that such consent is matched by return benefits-our
model conforms with the modern trend toward agreement-based jurisdiction. 2 3 6 Finally, by limiting jurisdictional consent via registration to cases
connected with the forum state, the proposal avoids the more difficult constitutional questions arising out of broad readings of registration statutes as a
general, all-purpose jurisdictional submission. 237
A.

The Vital Role of State Interests in JurisdictionalDoctrine

The proposed defined-consent Act specifies the sovereign state protective and prescriptive interests supporting the registered corporation's submission to jurisdiction. Such state interests are a cornerstone of horizontal
federalism, necessary to establish the validity of the state's regulatory and
adjudicative authority and to prevent unconstitutional overreach in extraterritorial regulation. 238 By defining these interests explicitly, our proposal relieves courts of the need for guesswork in deciding the permissible
constitutional parameters of the state's jurisdictional authority.
Forum state interests, as well as the shared interests of the combined
states within the larger system of federalism, are integral components of the
Supreme Court's jurisdictional framework. 239 On numerous occasions, the
Court's decisions have put the question of personal jurisdiction 'in play' more often than in the
past, encouraging motions to dismiss at a case's threshold with attendant cost and delay. Longarm jurisdiction clearly is getting shorter.").
234 See supra Part IV.A.
235 See infra Part V.A.
236 See infra Part V.B.
237 See infra Part V.C.

238 See Katherine Florey, What PersonalJurisdictionDoctrineDoes-and What It Should
Do, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1201, 1224-25 (2016) (explaining constitutional limits on extraterritorial regulation).
239 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (providing that "courts
in 'appropriate case[s]' may evaluate 'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest
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Court has relied on state statutory provisions to ascertain the scope of such
interests.'o In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,241 for example, the
Court regarded the state statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit in
California on insurance contracts with state residents as articulating the
state's "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." 242 Likewise, in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.,243 the Court eyed both the New Hampshire criminal
defamation statute as well as the state's long-arm statute to determine that
the state had an interest in both protecting nonresidents from libels circulated
within the state and shielding its own residents from falsehoods, even when
those falsehoods involved out-of-state victims.244

The Court has also underscored, in cases disclaiming adjudicative authority, the absence of legislative measures supporting the alleged state interests.' Consider Kulko v. Superior Court,2 4 6 where a divorcing parent moved
to California from the marital home in New York and later attempted to sue
her ex-spouse for increased child support in her new state of residence. 247 In
rebuffing her jurisdictional attempt, the Court noted that "California has not
attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its
courts by, e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute."2"8 Or take Shaffer v.
Heitner, where the shareholder appellee argued that Delaware courts should
be authorized to exercise jurisdiction in shareholder derivative actions over
nonresident corporate officers and directors of Delaware corporations.24 9 In
denying jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reasoned that the shareholder's argument was "undercut by the failure of the Delaware Legislature to assert
the state interest appellee finds so compelling," as the Delaware statute
in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,'
'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies'") (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
240 See Stewart E. Sterk, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1163,
1200 (2013) ("Concern about the forum state's sovereign interest has played a central role not
merely in cases expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction, but also in cases limiting the
scope of personal jurisdiction.").
241 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
242 Id. at 221-23 (upholding California's assertion of personal jurisdiction against nonresident insurer based on its solitary policy issued to a state resident).
243 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
244 Id. at 777 (upholding New Hampshire's assertion of jurisdiction for a nonresident's
claim based on a libel circulated within the state, reasoning in part that the misdemeanor libel
statute was not limited to residents and the state's long-arm statute had been amended to delete
the prior residence requirement for tort claims).
245 See Sterk, supra note 240, at 1200.
246 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
247 Id. at 87-88.
248 Id. at 98 (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 221, 224). The Court continued that California's
legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children within the state was served by its adoption of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which coordinated court
procedures for obtaining and enforcing child-support orders between a resident and nonresident without the parties having to depart from their home states. Id. at 98-99.
249 433 U.S. 186, 214 (1977).
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based jurisdiction "not on appellants' status as corporate fiduciaries, but
rather on the presence of their property in the State." 250 The Court stressed
that other states had enacted implied consent statutes for corporate fiduciaries, and concluded that "[ilf Delaware perceived its interest in securing
jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries to be as great as appellee suggests, we
would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect
that interest." 251 A mere thirteen days after the Supreme Court issued its
ruling, the Delaware legislature adopted just such a statute. 252
The plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro is thus
an aberration insofar as it failed to consider or discuss the forum state's sovereign interests supporting adjudicative authority and instead fixated solely
on the defendant's intent, manifested by its activities targeting the forum, "to
submit" to the sovereign's power. 253 Of course, all plurality opinions by definition are not binding precedent, but even more so here, as the Nicastro
plurality's attempted refashioning of "basic jurisdictional rules," through its
submission and targeting touchstone, was explicitly rejected by the other
five Justices. 254 In addition, as Professor Allan Erbsen has convincingly argued, the plurality's disregard of the state's manifest interests conflicts with a
more recent Supreme Court decision relying on comparable interests to authorize states to compel nonresident merchants without any in-state physical
presence to collect and remit sales taxes. 255 After all, "if South Dakota's
interests justified taxation of nonresident merchants, then New Jersey's interests could have justified jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers and
should not have been so casually dismissed." 256
States are therefore well advised to adopt a statute explicitly predicated
on the state's interests in protecting both state residents and the state's own
regulatory authority. Otherwise, the gaps left open after the Roberts Court's
jurisdictional holdings, which are already engendering regulatory voids and
difficulties for plaintiffs seeking to access justice, are unlikely to be
bridged. 257
Id.
Id. at 214-15.
252 See Winship, supra note 179, at 1177.
253 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (plurality opinion).
254 Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I do not agree with the plurality's seemingly strict
no-jurisdiction rule . . . ."); accord id. at 901 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The plurality's
notion that jurisdiction over foreign corporations depends upon the defendant's 'submission'
seems scarcely different from the long-discredited fiction of implied consent. It bears emphasis
that a majority of this Court's members do not share the plurality's view.").
255 Allan Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines Nicastro: The ConstitutionalConnection Between
State Tax Authority and PersonalJurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. 724, 727 (2019) ("Justice Kennedy's exaltation of state interests in Wayfair is strikingly inconsistent with his 2011 plurality
250
251

opinion . . . in Nicastro.").

Id. at 738.
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Fountaine, "Don't Come Around Here No More": Narrowing
Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Corporations in Illinois, 42 S. ILL. U. L.J. 593,
636-37 (2018) (detailing a "flurry of dismissals" predicated on the Supreme Court's new
jurisdictional doctrine that impose "significant access to justice hurdles for plaintiffs"); Adam
256
257
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Consider, as an example, Waite v. AH Acquisition Corp.258 James
Waite's various occupations while he lived in Massachusetts often exposed
him to asbestos products, including asbestos mined and sold by Union Carbide, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. 259
After Waite moved to Florida in 1978, he continued to be exposed to other
companies' asbestos products and tragically developed mesothelioma in
2015 from his life-long asbestos exposure. 260 Since "it is impossible to exclude any particular exposure from the causal chain leading to the development of th[is] disease," the Waites sued ten asbestos companies, including
Union Carbide, in his home state of Florida, where Union Carbide conducted
substantial activities, including operating a plant in the state, registering to
do business and maintaining an in-state agent continuously since 1949, selling asbestos products within the state through a distributor, and accessing
Florida courts as a plaintiff. 261 But the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Union Carbide from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, reasoning specific jurisdiction collapsed because Waite's Massachusetts exposure
to Union Carbide's asbestos was not connected to Florida, general jurisdiction failed because Union Carbide was "at home" only in Texas and New
York, and Union Carbide had not consented to jurisdiction by registering
when the Florida corporate registration scheme failed to specify any jurisdictional consequences for registering to do business. 262
The trouble with Waite's holding was not due to the Eleventh Circuit's
failure to follow the Roberts Court's jurisdictional decisions-rather, the injustice arose because the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements regarding
general and specific adjudicative power were dutifully observed. Under
these precedents, the Waites were denied any meaningful forum to pursue
their claims, 263 even though no conceivable jurisdictional rationale supports
disclaiming jurisdiction over Union Carbide in these circumstances.
In light of Union Carbide's substantial in-state business activities in
Florida and purposeful exploitation of the prescriptive and adjudicative proN. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REv.
1401, 1462 (2018) (highlighting concerns regarding access to justice after the recent personal
jurisdiction decisions in three scenarios: where a forum resident is injured at home by an outof-state defendant, when no alternative forum is available or adequate, and "where proceeding
in a single forum is necessary for effective adjudication of claims arising from a common
course of conduct").
258 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018).
2 59
Id. at 1310-11, 1317.
2 60

Id. at 1311.

261
2 62

Id. at 1311-12.

Id. at 1315-22.

The fora in which Union Carbide would be amenable to jurisdiction (New York, Texas,
and perhaps Massachusetts) would likely be unable to exercise jurisdiction over all the other
defendants contributing to this single injury, requiring duplicative litigation and creating a
substantial risk of inconsistent judgments, with the amenable defendants placing blame on the
non-amenable defendants in each action. This illustrates why, as Justice Jackson remarked long
ago, a "choice of courts" is often necessary for plaintiffs to ensure "some place in which to
pursue [a] remedy." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
263
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tections of Florida law, defending against the Waites' claims imposed no
burden, difficulty, or inconvenience, much less a "severe disadvantage." 264
Rather, Florida, even from Union Carbide's perspective, was a convenient
forum, with the most salient medical records and witnesses present in the
state regarding Waite's comparative exposure to asbestos and his subsequent
development of mesothelioma. 265 The Waites' Florida suit was hardly unexpected to Union Carbide when it had been peddling its asbestos products
within the state's market for decades and defending against numerous other
comparable claims arising from these products. 266 The suit implicated several
compelling interrelated regulatory interests of the sovereign state of Florida:
protecting its residents from suffering an injury in the state (even from outof-state exposure), 267 ensuring a convenient forum for its residents to redress
injuries caused by nonresidents, 268 and preserving a safe environment for its
residents. 269 Florida's adjudicative regulation of this controversy threatened
no incursion on the sovereignty of any co-equal state, as no other state had
nearly as substantial a juridical claim. 270 The Waites, Florida residents for
almost four decades, were not forum shopping 271-to the contrary, they pursued their claims against all the potential defendants in the state wherein the
disease manifested, Waite received treatment, and Waite was exposed to

24 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (acknowledging
forum
cannot be "so gravely difficult and inconvenient" that a defendant is at a severe litigation
disadvantage).
265 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (indicating presence of forum witnesses and records impacts personal jurisdiction query).
266 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (emphasizing predictability and defendants' expectations in structuring conduct to avoid suit in a forum).
267 See Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939) (noting
"[flew matters could be deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the
injury occurs or more completely within its power" than "the bodily safety and economic
protection" of those injured within its borders); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (recognizing state's "significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State," whether to residents or nonresidents). Waite, while exposed to
Union Carbide's products in Massachusetts, likely did not suffer a redressable legal injury until
his mesothelioma diagnosis in Florida. See Waite, 901 F.3d at 1315.
268 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (highlighting state's interest "in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors"); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (explaining due process does not bar
states from protecting their citizens from the injustice of seeking redress only in some distant
state).
269 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776 (underscoring state interest in safeguarding its citizens
from deception and libels regarding a nonresident); cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-15 (1987) (buttressing holding disclaiming jurisdiction because
presented dispute between two foreign product manufacturers concerned indemnification
rather than the state's interest in ensuring compliance with its safety standards).
270 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (reasoning the sovereign power of each
state to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction "implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of
its sister States").
271 Cf Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (expressing concern that jurisdiction not be available for any claim in every state in which a party conducts continuous and
systematic activities).

2020]

A New State RegistrationAct

423

other asbestos products. 2 72 Indeed, Florida apparently was the state which
could secure, for the interstate judicial system, the most efficient resolution
of the controversy, with no other state likely connected to all ten defendants
in order to adjudicate their comparative fault.2 7 3 Accordingly, the Roberts
Court's new formalistic rules governing the state's jurisdictional boundaries
compelled the denial of any meaningful access to justice for the Waites, even
though all the heretofore recognized normative considerations justified Florida's resolution of this dispute. 2 74
Our consent proposal would preclude such injustices, which are becoming too common under the Supreme Court's new rigid approach to general
and specific jurisdiction. 2 75 Notice Waite discounted Union Carbide's compliance with Florida's statutory corporate registration scheme because
"[n]othing in these provisions would alert a corporation that its compliance
would be construed as consent to answer in Florida's courts for any purpose." 2 7 6 But our proposal would provide exactly such notice, authorizing
jurisdiction on several grounds closely tied to Florida's sovereign prescriptive and protective interests. The suit, after all, was brought by state citizens;
the legal injury was suffered in Florida when the disease manifested; and the
claim likely is governed by Florida law. 277
Jurisdictional consent can thus play a key role in facilitating a remedy
in situations involving eminently fair and reasonable jurisdictional assertions
when neither general nor specific jurisdiction, as reshaped by the Roberts
Court, currently exists. Although our proposed statute reaches only those

272 See Waite, 901 F.3d at 1310-11. The Court has repeatedly recognized "the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief." E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quot-

ing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
273 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777 (highlighting, in the context of a libel proceeding, the
substantial interest in state cooperation to provide a single forum for efficiently litigating all
issues and damage claims arising from a controversy in order to conserve judicial resources).
274 See Robertson & Rhodes, Business, supra note 11, at 788-90 (emphasizing the risk to
seeking effective redress from the influence of formalism and territorial boundaries in the
Roberts Court's jurisdictional decisions).
275 See Fountaine, supra note 257, at 636-37; cf Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., No. A-1-

CA-36402, 2018 WL 6716038, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018) (interpreting Ford's registration to do business in New Mexico as consent to jurisdiction when Ford argued it could not
be subject to jurisdiction in New Mexico for a products liability claim stemming from a New
Mexico citizen's death in a single vehicle accident in New Mexico because it was not at home
in New Mexico and did not design, manufacture, sell, or service the vehicle in New Mexico).
276 Waite, 901 F.3d at 1320. The court did subsequently note that "an overly broad interpretation" of a corporate registration scheme as a general jurisdictional consent might contradict the Supreme Court's recent cautions against "'exorbitant exercises' of general

jurisdiction." Id. at 1322 n.5 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014)). As
discussed in more detail below, our constrained proposal here, limited to well-recognized state
regulatory and protective interests, alleviates any such potential constitutional concern. See
infra Part V.C.
277 See supra Part IV.B (setting out the potential bases for registration-based personal
jurisdiction). Since the Waites' suit was removed to federal court from state court, see Waite,

901 F.3d at 13 10-11, our proposed paragraph (5), applicable to claims with a risk of conflicting judgments from separate proceedings, would apparently not be implicated since one or
more of the defendants must be "at home" in the forum state, see supra Part IV.B.
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cases in which the corporate defendant registers in-state, such registration
ensures an affiliation with the sovereign that indicates the defendant's amenability will not be unduly burdensome in light of the statutorily defined
regulatory, protective, and prescriptive sovereign adjudicative interests at
stake. A state legislature adopting such a statute thus ensures its appropriate
role in defining the state's own sovereign interests and progresses toward
shrinking the access-to-justice gaps created by the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence. 2 78
B.

Explicit JurisdictionalConsent Comports with the Modern Trend of
Agreement-Based Jurisdiction

Our proposed jurisdictional consent statute, which provides corporations a meaningful choice on whether to exchange a limited amenability for
the privilege of conducting activities within and employing the courts of the
state, fits comfortably within the modern trend of agreement-based adjudication. Over the last few decades, the civil litigation landscape has shifted in
many respects to accommodate parties' forum choices, and courts now routinely enforce ex ante agreements selecting the forum as well as the adjudicator. 279 The New York Convention governing arbitration agreements, which
entered into force in 1959,280 marked a key early step. It made arbitration an
effective option for international contracts, and its success paved the way for
agreement-based adjudication to gain favor in numerous other contexts. 281
Consider forum-selection clauses, which American courts historically
disfavored and frequently refused to enforce on public policy grounds before
the 1970s. 28 2 Then, in 1972, the Supreme Court upheld a forum-selection
clause, albeit in a complex, negotiated agreement between an American and
a German corporation to tow an ocean-going drilling rig from the Gulf of
Mexico to the Adriatic Sea. 283 Yet by the early 1990s, the Court was extolling the virtues of forum-selection clauses even in non-negotiated consumer
278 See Cody J. Jacobs, In Defense of TerritorialJurisdiction, 85 U. CHI. L. REv. 1589,
1593 (2018) (noting "registration and implied consent statutes would return state legislatures
to a central role in defining the scope of courts' jurisdiction").
279 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Interpretationand Effect of PermissiveForum Selection
Clauses Under U.S. Law, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 152 (2018) ("It is easy to articulate a
general rule regarding the treatment of forum selection clauses in U.S. courts: almost always,
in consumer as well as commercial contracts, they will be given effect.").
280 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
281 See Linda Silberman, The New York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on
the Role of National Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 25, 26, 46 (2009) (writing "[o]ne can
only marvel at the success of the New York Convention over its fifty-year span," and recognizing "how important the Convention has been in creating a vibrant climate in which international arbitration has flourished").
282 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 & n.10 (1972) (collecting
sources).
283

Id. at 17-18.
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adhesion contracts, suggesting that such clauses benefitted the parties by
limiting the fora in which a defendant with worldwide connections would be
subject to suit; "dispelling any confusion" about where suits under the contract would be decided, thereby "sparing litigants the time and expense of
pretrial motions" dealing with jurisdictional issues; and even lowering consumer costs. 28 4 The Roberts Court recently reiterated its commitment to upholding the parties' forum choices in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v.
U.S. District Court,28 5 specifying that "[olnly under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties" should a motion to
transfer based on a forum-selection clause be denied. 28 6 In reaching this
holding, the Court emphasized that the enforcement of such clauses furthered the parties' "settled expectations." 28 7 Because the forum-selection
term was assented to by the parties and "may, in fact, have been a critical
factor in their agreement to do business together in the first place," the Court
held that "[iln all but the most unusual cases, therefore, 'the interest of
justice' is served by holding parties to their bargain." 288
Under similar reasoning, courts now routinely enforce a diverse array
of contractual adjudication provisions-even ones found in boilerplate consumer contracts that lack options for individual negotiation. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court recently upheld the waiver of aggregation rights
under an arbitration agreement. 28 9 Likewise, most states have allowed the
pre-dispute waiver of jury-trial rights. 29 0 When such terms are included in
mass consumer contracts, the consumer's choice is not about whether to accept or reject the particular term-instead, the choice is about whether to
accept or reject the contract altogether, as there is no allowance for individual negotiation. This "choice" may be somewhat illusory. Living in the
twenty-first century without smart or cell phones, credit cards, computer operating systems, or computer software is not realistic for most Americans. 291
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has reasoned that the agreement to adjudication-based terms is baked into the contract price and into the parties' deal-

See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
571 U.S. 49 (2013).
286 Id. at 62.
287 Id. at 66.
288 Id.
289 See Am. Exp. Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013) ("The class-action
waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting parties.").
290 California is a notable exception in this regard. See California Court Foils Attempt to
Avoid Prohibition on Pre-Dispute Jury Waivers, McGUIREWOODS (May 4, 2017), http:II
www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2017/5/California-Court-Foils-AttemptAvoid-Prohibition-Pre-Dispute-Jury-Waivers [https://perma.cc/JV6T-5QP7] ("While most
states permit parties to waive the right to a jury trial by contract before a dispute arises, the
California Supreme Court held over a decade ago that California is not one of them.").
291 Cf Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (discussing involuntary
nature of carrying cell phones in modern life).
284
285
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ings with one another, and the Court has therefore been willing to uphold
such agreements. 29 2
Of course, our proposed explicit consent-by-registration statute is not a
typical form or negotiated contract, but the acceptance of obligations to acquire specified benefits under the sovereign authority of the state. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has long viewed such statutory exchanges of
obligations and benefits as manifesting valid consent. 293 In Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,29 4 for example, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Frankfurter, determined that registration statutes requiring the designation of an agent are "constitutional," with "the designation of the agent 'a
voluntary act"' that manifests "a real consent." 29 5 In the more recent case of
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc.,296 Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court differentiated consensual jurisdiction under a registration and
appointment statute from the minimum contacts analysis, and then presumed
that an appointment of an agent could operate as a consent to general
jurisdiction. 29 7
This concept of pre-dispute consent by acquiring specified benefits
under the sovereign authority of the state has been further extended in recent
years. One example, as discussed previously, is that officers or directors in
Delaware corporations are "deemed to have consented to jurisdiction in the
courts of that state for any claim concerning breach of fiduciary duty," with
the courts upholding the constitutionality of this deemed consent despite
scholarly objections. 298 And a number of states, once again led by Delaware,
have allowed corporations to designate a forum for "internal corporate
292 See Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 66.
293 See, e.g., Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 378 (1878) (noting a nonresident cor-

poration "may, for the purpose of securing business, consent to be 'found' away from home,
for the purposes of suit as to matters growing out of its transactions").
294

308 U.S. 165 (1939).

Id. at 175 (quoting Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917)
& Bagdon v. Phila. Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 1916)). Neirbo
addressed whether the then-governing federal venue statute was satisfied by a foreign corporation's designation of an agent for service of process under a state registration and authorization
statute. Id. at 167. Under the Court's interpretation of the relevant venue provisions, the propriety of venue depended on whether the corporation's consent under state law was valid and
constitutional. Id. at 174-75.
296 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
297 Id. at 889-93. The Court thereafter held that requiring such an all-purpose jurisdictional submission to prevent the tolling of limitations against an out-of-state corporation was
an undue burden on interstate commerce. See id. The Court's dormant commerce clause analysis will be discussed in more detail in Part V.C.2. For present purposes, though, the key is the
Court signaled that registering and appointing an agent represented a mode of consent for
jurisdictional purposes outside the minimum contacts test. See id. Bendix is also noteworthy
because it was decided six years after the Court did not mention registration as one of the
listed examples of jurisdictional consent in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-05 (1982). Thus, any significance attributed to the
Insurance Corp. omission appears misplaced, as Bendix thereafter indicated registration was a
mode of consent. Cf Monestier, supra note 22, at 1381-83.
298 Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate "Contracts", 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 296 & nn.151-52 (2018) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
295
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claims" in the corporate charter or even its bylaws. 29 9 Such provisionswhich likewise have been routinely upheld by the courts despite objections-require shareholder suits to be brought only in the state of incorporation, and provide that those purchasing shares in the corporation are
"deemed ... to have consented to personal jurisdiction in the selected-forum
court in a proceeding brought to enforce the exclusive forum-term."3 00
Our proposal, though, does not extend this far. Instead, we propose incorporating safeguards and limitations to ensure actual notice to the corporation of the jurisdictional consequences of registration and to provide the
corporation the means to withhold such consent.3 01 So while Delaware law
deems acts such as accepting a fiduciary position with or purchasing shares
in a Delaware corporation as a consent to jurisdiction, regardless of the actor's notice or knowledge of the consequences of the act, our proposal mandates an explicit notification to the corporation of the specific terms of the
granted consent, with the corporation then having a real choice whether to
register or, if it has previously registered, the option to withdraw its registration and avoid granting jurisdictional consent.
This is a meaningful choice. Recall that registration is only required
when a corporation is engaging in an ongoing and regular course of intrastate or local business activity comparable in nature to a local business enterprise-registration is not necessary if the corporation is only conducting
interstate business activities with state residents, or isolated in-state transactions, or mere solicitations within the state to do business.3 02 As a result, a
corporation has alternative avenues, even without registering to do business,
to obtain economic benefits from a state and to provide goods and services
to state residents. Moreover, a corporate entity seeking to perform those instate business operations requiring registration could have a corporate subsidiary or related corporate entity register and conduct the intrastate activities, with the granted jurisdictional consent then extending only to the
registering corporate entity.3 03 In light of such alternatives, corporations in
fact possess a greater appreciable choice whether to apply for or revoke their
§ 3114 (2017)); see supra Parts III & V.A. (discussing the adoption of this provision in the
wake of Shaffer v. Heitner).
299 Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 298, at 273-74 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115
(2017)). Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington have followed Delaware's lead in allowing such forum-selection provisions. Id. As of
2014, approximately 750 corporations have adopted such provisions. Id.
300 Id. at 274-76.
301 See supra Part IV.B.

302 See Joyce Yeager, Borders and Barriers, Definition of Authority to Do Business as a
Foreign Corporation, 102 CoM. L.J. 398, 420-21 (1997) ("The purpose of registration requirements is to force those foreign corporations intent upon conducting business on a continuous
basis to qualify . . . . To do business a foreign corporation must do more than make a single
contract, or engage in an isolated piece of business or an occasional undertaking; the foreign
corporation must maintain continuity to be doing business."); see also supra Part III.
303 Cf Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., No. 8:14-CV-403, 2015 WL 1538088, at *8 (D. Neb.
Apr. 7, 2015) ("The Court is aware of no authority suggesting that Merial LLC's consent to
jurisdiction is imputable to Merial SAS simply by virtue of their corporate affiliation."). It is
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authority to conduct in-state business than many of the same corporations
offer to consumers in take-it-or-leave-it adhesion contracts.
The jurisdictional consequences of a corporation's deliberate decision to
transact business in the forum are also significantly less under our proposal
than existed before the Roberts Court's "at home" limitation on general adjudicative power. Under prior general jurisdiction precedent, after all, "continuous and systematic" forum activities subjected a corporation to
amenability in that state for any and all claims.3 04 As interpreted by many
lower courts, this former "continuous and systematic" general jurisdiction
test actually required less in-state activity than necessary for the corporation
to be "transacting business" under corporate registration statutes.3 05 So for
almost a century before the "at home" limitation, a corporation choosing to
conduct "continuous and systematic" forum activities, even if those activities were not extensive enough to require registration and authorization to do
business, risked being subject to suit in the forum for any claim arising anywhere in the world. In contrast, under our proposal, only those corporations
deliberately choosing to register in the forum, as a result of their more extensive in-state activities, will thereby exchange a limited consent to be sued in
the forum (confined to specifically defined circumstances implicating state
sovereign interests) in order to obtain the state's permission to conduct instate business and to access the state's courts.
Such an exchange furthers policies comparable to those of other ex ante
forum-selection agreements. The corporation's consent to jurisdiction spares
litigants and the judiciary from the burdens, expense, and strain of jurisdictional discovery and pre-trial dismissal motions, enabling a more efficient
consideration of the merits of the dispute.3 06 The corporation, with knowledge of its amenability risk, may alleviate potential economic consequences
by procuring insurance or passing on anticipated costs. 3 0 7 The corporation's
compliance with its bargain also advances the settled expectations of the
state and its sovereign citizens,3 08 who have granted the corporation the right
to transact intrastate business and to maintain suits in its courts.3 09 These
possible, of course, that the consent would not be so limited if an alter ego theory justified
piercing the corporate veil.
3 See supra Part II.
305 See, e.g., Neth. Shipmortgage Corp., Ltd. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1983)
(recognizing some activities subjecting the nonresident to adjudicative jurisdiction will not
constitute transacting business); Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon Prods. U.S.A.,
Inc., 536 A.2d 633, 637 (Md. 1988) (holding unqualified corporation can be barred from suing
in state courts only based upon a "significantly greater amount of local activity" than the
minimum for personal jurisdiction); Long Mfg. Co. v. Wright-Way Farm Serv., Inc., 214
N.W.2d 816, 818-20 (Mich. 1974) (holding isolated or independent intrastate activities, even
if sufficient to establish adjudicative jurisdiction, are insufficient to require registration).
306 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593
(1991).
307 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
308 See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571 U.S. 49, 66 (2013).
309 See Chase, supra note 104, at 159-60 ("States primarily incentivize
registration by
closing their courts to nonregistrant foreign corporations that 'do business' in the state until
they do register.").

A New State RegistrationAct

2020]

429

granted benefits parallel the corporation's obligations under the exchange, as
a corporation transacting enough in-state business to need the state's authorization to engage in its desired activities and to access state courts as a plaintiff can reasonably be expected to consent to jurisdiction in those suits that
are either related to legitimate exercises of the state's regulatory authority or
maintained by state residents.
C.

The Proposed Defined-Consent Registration Scheme Satisfies
ConstitutionalLimits

The recent abolition of general "doing business" jurisdiction, as discussed earlier, intensified a long-simmering scholarly and judicial debate regarding whether existing corporate registration statutes operate as a consent
to general, all-purpose jurisdiction and, if so, whether this interpretation
transgresses constitutional limitations.3 10 Some scholars have argued that
such a reading does violate due process, the dormant commerce clause, or
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.3 11 Others, however, have defended
the constitutionality of general jurisdictional consent through registration.3 12
These issues are now percolating through the courts, requiring judges to
grapple with the underlying constitutional questions, typically without any
guidance other than century-old, pre-InternationalShoe Supreme Court precedent and tea leaves from the Court's more recent decisions. 313
Our proposal, though, avoids this ongoing debate, by limiting a corporation's jurisdictional consent to specified circumstances implicating state
sovereign interests. As a result, we make only a narrower claim here: our
proposal comports with any potential constitutional limits.

310 See supra Part

IV.A.

311 E.g., John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal Jurisdic-

tion, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121, 163-64 (2016) ("[C]ourts should hold that jurisdiction based on
(1) business registration, (2) extensive business contacts, and (3) service of process each violate the Dormant Commerce Clause in cases brought by non-residents injured out of state.");
Monestier, supra note 22, at 1412 (arguing that "premising general jurisdiction on a corporation's registration and appointment of an agent for service of process is inconsistent with due
process"); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 16, at 442-44 (urging general, all-purpose
jurisdiction over registering corporations for unrelated claims is "ripe for invalidation by the
Supreme Court").
312 E.g., Chase, supra note 104, at 162-68; Harrison, supra note 104, at 480-81. We previously urged similarly but in less detail than the position taken here-that registration statutes
can operate as a consent to jurisdiction with respect to "those actions implicating sufficient
state sovereign interests, including state interests in prescribing the substantive law governing
the action or providing a convenient forum for injured residents," as long as the corporation
has legally sufficient notice of the interpretation. Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting Equilibrium,
supra note 11, at 662-64.
313 E.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., No. A-1-CA-36402, 2018 WL 6716038, at *1
(N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018) (following the Supreme Court's century-old precedents to hold
that the defendant consented to general jurisdiction in the state by registering to do business);
see also supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court's early case law on consent by corporation registration).

430

Harvard Journal on Legislation
1.

[Vol. 57

Due Process

The Due Process Clause applies to all government conduct, 314 which of
course would encompass our proposed defined-consent registration scheme.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the due process
framework for obtaining jurisdictional consent through corporate registration, three somewhat interrelated concerns are detectable from analogous decisions. First, the corporation must have legally sufficient notice of the scope
of the consent granted, such that consent at least cannot extend beyond the
limits specified by either the terms of the registration statute or its case-law
interpretation. 315 Second, due process ensures the government's compliance
with fundamental notions of fairness with respect to any exercise of its
power, which may require a congruence between the scope of the consent
granted and the state benefits obtained as part of the exchange. 316 Third, because Daimler warned against "grasping" or "exorbitant" jurisdictional
rules that defendants cannot avoid, due process may independently mandate
that corporations have the opportunity "to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit." 3 1 7

Our proposal readily satisfies each of these potential limits. As discussed previously, a possible difficulty both with existing registration statutes, which are almost always silent on the consequences of registration, and
other existing forms of statutory implied jurisdictional consent manifested
through conduct, such as accepting a fiduciary position with or purchasing
shares in a corporation, is the lack of actual notice of the consequences of
the act. 318 But our express proposal provides notice in a way that an implied
condition does not, allowing corporations the opportunity to choose voluntarily whether to subject their business to the state's jurisdiction in specified

314 See Rhodes, Liberty, supra note 59, at 572-76.

315 E.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 409 (1929) (concluding,
"in
the absence of language compelling it," a registration statute should not authorize state courts
to obtain jurisdiction over transactions unconnected to sovereign interests); Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 215, 216 (1921) (reasoning the scope of
the corporation's consent depends on explicit provisions of registration statutes or their judicial
construction).
316 See N.C. Dep't of Rev. v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213,

2219-20 (2019).
317

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
318 See, e.g., Chiappinelli, supra note 179, at 813 (urging such implied consent is both
"ineffective and unhelpful"); Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 298, at 274-76 (discussing notice problems to shareholders); Craig Sanders, Note, Of Carrotsand Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine Consent, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1323, 1334 (2017) ("A corporation cannot
consent to something it does not realize it is consenting to, and nearly all fifty states have
registration statutes that are silent on the effects of registering.").
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circumstances in return for the state's permission to conduct in-state business
operations and to access its courts. 319
This exchange is proportional, with the state-granted benefits mirroring
the corporation's obligations. In other scenarios involving the grant of state
benefits accompanied by conditions on constitutional rights, the Supreme
Court has required a suitable connection between the privilege granted to the
citizen to engage in the activity and the government's conditions on that
activity. Take, for example, state "implied consent" laws to blood-alcohol
testing, which provide that consent to a Fourth Amendment breath or blood
search, when a motorist is suspected of drunk driving, is a condition for the
privilege of driving on the state's roads. 320 The Supreme Court has indicated
that such laws are constitutional when merely imposing civil penalties (like
revoking or suspending a driver's license) or evidentiary consequences (such
as admitting the refusal as evidence of intoxication) on those refusing to
comply, but the state cannot impose criminal penalties on a refusal because
"[tlhere must be a limit on the consequences to which motorists may be
deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on the public
roads." 321 Similarly, the government may condition a land-use permit on a
relinquishment of private property when there is a "nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the property demand and the effects of the private
land use authorized by the permit, but the government may not leverage its
conditions to pursue unrelated government objectives. 322 Due process may
mandate, then, that jurisdictional consent, as a condition of corporate registration, only be imposed in fair relation to the benefits, protections, and opportunities granted by the state. 323 If so, our proposal precisely satisfies this
requirement-the consent is limited to those suits related to those sovereign
protective, prescriptive, and regulatory state interests implicated when a corporation is engaging in local, ongoing business activities and accessing the
state's courts as a plaintiff against state residents.
These constraints on the jurisdictional bases for consent also ensure the
proposed act comports with fair play and substantial justice by restricting the
potential locales for a suit arising out of a particular transaction. Some
courts, in the course of refusing to interpret existing registration statutes as
requiring all-purpose consent to jurisdiction, have reasoned that adopting

319 Of course, the sufficiency of lead time is a matter that could be raised and debated
through the Uniform Law Commission process. See supra Part IV.C.
320 See ROBERT L. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 177-79 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing the origins of such statutes).
321 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185
(2016).
322 E.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595,
605-06 (2013);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-92 (1994).
323 Cf N.C. Dep't of Rev. v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139
S. Ct. 2213,
2219-20 (2019) (limiting, under the Due Process Clause, state taxation to those taxes with
"fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state," when the "state
has given anything for which it can ask return") (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
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such an interpretation would conflict with Daimler's due process caution
against grasping or exorbitant jurisdictional rules subjecting a defendant to
suit everywhere with respect to a particular claim.324 Our proposed Act,
though, would not require a registering corporation to consent to open-ended
general jurisdiction. There only would be a handful of potential fora to adjudicate its liability for its activities allegedly causing harm to a particular
claimant, such as the plaintiff's domicile, the place of injury, the locales of
the corporate activities related to the claim, or the home states of inseparable
co-defendants. With respect to these potential fora, the corporation is obtaining state benefits and protections from its registration, and the states
have sovereign interests in adjudicating such claims, ensuring that the corporation's agreed consent to jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" safeguarded by the Due Process Clause. 325
2.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

The dormant commerce clause is another potential impediment to jurisdiction based on in-state registration. 326 This negative implication from the
Constitution's grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce among
the states prohibits states from unduly burdening interstate commerce by
barring discrimination against out-of-state entities and by limiting states'
abilities to regulate extraterritorially. 327 In a series of early twentieth-century
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that exorbitant state-law jurisdictional
assertions may effectuate undue burdens on interstate commerce and thereby
violate the dormant commerce clause. 328
324 E.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D. Del. 2014),
aff'dsub nom. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016).
325 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
326 See Cepec, 137 A.3d at 142 ("[I]n our federal republic, exacting such a disproportionate toll on commerce is itself constitutionally problematic."); Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting
Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 664 ("[R]equiring a corporation to subject itself to all-purpose
jurisdiction may violate the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing unconstitutional burdens
on out-of-state businesses.").
327 Florey, supra note 238, at 1224-25 ("[T]he dormant commerce clause perhaps in
tandem with structural constitutional principles-limits the degree to which states can regulate
extraterritorially.").
328 See Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1929) (holding statutory
service in Missouri on soliciting freight agent of a Michigan railroad unduly burdened interstate commerce when the railroad transacted no in-state Missouri business, the accident occurred in Michigan, and both parties resided in Michigan at the time of the accident);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924) (holding interpretation of Texas garnishment statutes whereby a nonresident obtained a Texas judgment on a
claim arising outside Texas against a Kansas railroad that did not transact any in-state Texas
business violated the dormant commerce clause); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262
U.S. 312, 315-17 (1923) (sustaining a Commerce Clause challenge to statute allowing service
on a railroad's solicitation agent when the railroad was not engaged in in-state business, the
plaintiff did not reside in the forum, and the cause of action had no connection with the forum); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 202-05 (1914) (holding an out-of-state corporation exclusively engaged in interstate commerce could not be excluded from the state
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A modem pathmarking Supreme Court decision is Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, which held that an Ohio statute tolling limitations when a nonresident corporation did not have an agent for service of
process within the state violated the Commerce Clause. 329 The Court reasoned that the tolling statute burdened out-of-state companies by making
them choose whether to submit to jurisdiction or to give up a statute of
limitations defense. 330 This burden, in the Court's view, was not matched by
a corresponding benefit to the state; the Court concluded that the state's "legitimate sphere of regulation is not much advanced by the statute," and that
"the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the tolling statute exceeds
any local interest that the State might advance." 331
The balancing required by Bendix provides a compelling argument for
limiting the reach of a registration statute's jurisdictional consent in the manner we propose. In a recent article, Professor Jack Preis argued that registration statutes are invalid under Bendix when jurisdictional consent extends to
situations "where the plaintiff is a non-resident injured out of state," as such
broad-based jurisdiction exceeds the forum state's interest. 3 3 2 But in those
cases where the state does actually possess a legitimate sovereign interest
(such as the cases governed by our registration proposal), scholars largely
agree that the dormant commerce clause poses no barrier to consent-based
jurisdiction. 3 3 3
The Supreme Court's early twentieth-century dormant commerce clause
holdings on the jurisdictional consequences of registration statutes are in
accord. Take Denver & Rio Grande Western RailroadCo. v. Terte, 334 where a
then-bona fide Missouri resident filed an action in Missouri against two separate out-of-state railroads, Santa Fe and Rio Grande, for injuries resulting
from a Colorado workplace accident he suffered while residing there. 335 The
railroads both objected that the jurisdictional assertion violated the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court agreed with
Rio Grande's Commerce Clause argument, as Rio Grande did not operate
any railroad line in Missouri, was not transacting in-state business in Missouri, and had not registered to do business in Missouri. 336 Nonetheless, the
Court summarily upheld jurisdiction over Santa Fe, as it was operating railroad lines in Missouri and had accordingly obtained a license to do business

courts for failing to register since such registration was "particularly burdensome, because . .
it requires the corporation to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in
general as a prerequisite to suing in any of them").
329 486 U.S. 888, 892-95 (1988).
330 Id.
331 Id. at 891.
332 Preis, supra note 311, at 154.
333 Id.; see also Harrison, supra note 104, at 545-46; Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 661-66.
334 284 U.S. 284 (1932).
335 Id. at 286.
336

Id. at 286-87.
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there. 337 The Court thus held the extensive intrastate Missouri activities and
in-state licensing of Santa Fe allowed the state to exercise jurisdiction over it
for claims asserted by a state citizen, even though his claims arose in another
state. 338 Of course, our proposal would operate similarly, allowing state citizens to sue in-state registered corporations no matter where the claim arose.
The "common thread" identified by the Supreme Court with respect to
its decisions finding a dormant commerce clause violation is that "the State
interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market either through
prohibition or through burdensome regulation." 339 But rather than interfering
with the functioning of the interstate market, our proposal facilitates it. The
most difficult jurisdictional cases tend to be tort cases-where the parties do
not know in advance that a dispute is likely to arise, and therefore do not
attempt to negotiate a forum ex ante. When an injury does arise, though, the
market is concerned with compensating for the injuries and allocating liability among all those potentially liable for the injury, including product manufacturers, component manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and resellers. By
ensuring a convenient single forum for addressing almost all (if not all) the
claims arising from a defective product, our defined-consent proposal promotes an efficient functioning of the interstate market without imposing an
undue burden on any party. Indeed, it is even possible that, as consumers
become more aware of the difficulty of pursuing remedies against out-ofstate corporations, 340 some corporations may employ registration as a competitive edge, advertising their registration as attesting to their commitment
to the quality and safety of their products. But in any event, as the Supreme
Court long ago recognized, the dormant commerce clause is not violated,
even when interstate commerce is incidentally burdened, by a jurisdictional
submission to those "requirements of orderly, effective administration of
justice" that regulate the interstate market. 34 1
3.

Unconstitutional Conditions

Finally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has also been used to
challenge broad-based registration statutes. This doctrine "vindicates the
337 See id. The Court relied on "the doctrine approved in" its earlier decision in Hoffman
v. Missouri, 274 U.S. 21 (1927), which had held that the dormant commerce clause did not bar
suit against a Missouri railroad sued in Missouri for an accident occurring in Kansas because
the railroad was sued in its state of incorporation, it owned and operated a railroad there, and it
carried on intrastate business there, id. at 22-23. Terte sub silentio extended the Hoffman rule
to a railroad which was not incorporated in the forum state but was licensed to and did conduct
intrastate business there. See Terte, 284 U.S. at 286-87.
338 See Terte, 284 U.S. at 286-87.
339 McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 225 (2013) (citation omitted).
340 See, e.g., Wilbur D. Owens & Joseph A. Mulherin, The Chinese Manufacture Everything and You Cannot Sue Them!, OWENS & MULHERIN, https://www.owensmulherin.com/recent-cases/chinese-manufacture-everything-cannot-sue
[https://perma.cc/U5Y2-MPAR]
(explaining difficulties of pursuing remedies against Chinese defendants).
341 Hoffman, 274 U.S. at
23.
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Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up," 342 thereby invalidating government-compelled surrenders of a constitutional right "in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no
relationship" to the surrendered right. 343 In the jurisdictional context, the Supreme Court has employed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to bar
states from conditioning an entity's right to do business in the state on its
willingness to give up its right to remove a case to federal court. 344
The United States Chamber of Commerce drew on this parallel in an
amicus brief in Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan PharmaceuticalsInc.,345
arguing that consent-by-registration violates the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. 346 It maintained that, just as the Court has held that a state cannot
condition registration on surrendering the right to remove a case to federal
court, so too could the state not condition registration on consenting to jurisdiction within the state; specifically, the Chamber urged that such a rule
would require the defendant to give up "the due process protection recognized in Daimler"347-that is, the right "to structure their affairs to provide
some assurance regarding where a claim might be asserted." 348 Under this
scenario, "[e]very state could enact a statute requiring consent to general
jurisdiction, with the result that a corporation could be sued everywhere on
any claim arising anywhere in the world." 349
The Federal Circuit did not reach the issue, but a concurrence by Judge
O'Malley expressed skepticism that the doctrine would apply to personal
jurisdiction. She noted that "the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of
consent-by-registration statutes numerous times since the development of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine." 350 She also suggested that the
Court had earlier distinguished between attempting to "deny foreign corporations access to the federal courts," which the Supreme Court had not allowed, and requiring foreign corporations "to consent to general personal
jurisdiction as a condition of being granted the right to do business in that
state," which the Court had upheld in the same era. 35 1

342
343

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (regulatory takings case).

" See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 60 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court precedent at the turn
of the twentieth century eventually settling "that a state may not condition the privilege of
doing business on a foreign corporation's waiver of its federal right of removal").
345

78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. Del. 2015).

346 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce, Acordas, 78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (No.

14-935-LPS).
347 Id. at 20.
348 Id. at 9.
349

Id.

350 Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 770 n.1 (Fed. Cir.

2016) (O'Malley, J., concurring).
351 See id. (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 173-74
(1939)).

436

Harvard Journal on Legislation

[Vol. 57

In any event, a registration statute requiring broad consent to general
jurisdiction would undoubtedly be challenged under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, with the judiciary then having to address whether imposing this condition unconstitutionally leverages the state's regulatory authority over the in-state conduct of business to obtain a waiver of due
process rights. Regardless of the resolution of this issue, however, our proposed consent statute is narrow enough to stay well on the side of constitutional permissibility. As we have written elsewhere, a registration statute
will not trigger the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as long as it meets
three requirements: (1) the statute must give notice of the terms ex ante; (2)
both parties to the agreement must receive some benefit from it (that is, the
exchange must actually be an exchange, and not a mere fiction); and (3) the
forum state cannot seek consent to jurisdiction exceeding its sovereign
interest.

352

The proposed statute satisfies all three of those requirements. As discussed above, adopting an explicit statute in the modern era will give notice
of the terms and allow businesses to make an informed choice about whether
to register. 353 Businesses who register will also obtain real benefits-the opportunity to transact business within the state and the ability to sue as a
plaintiff in state courts. And they may also use this ex ante jurisdictional
consent as a competitive measure, as it allows registering parties essentially
to agree to a forum selection clause even without knowing the identity of
other potential parties in the case. Finally, and essentially, the statute applies
only to those areas in which the state possesses genuine sovereign interests.
The absence of such interests invalidates conditioning registration on giving
up the removal power, but a personal jurisdiction statute that hews closely to
legitimate state interests does not run the same risk of upending state-federal
relations. 354 Indeed, when federal procedure accommodates the states' interests, our federal system is strengthened. 355
VI.

CONCLUSION

The demise of general jurisdiction leaves regulatory gaps that have not
been bridged by a corresponding expansion of specific jurisdiction. As a
352 Robertson & Rhodes, Shifting Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 663-64.

353 See supra Part IV.A.
354 See Berman, supra note 344, at 68 (noting that, while the Court's rationale was far
from clear in its cases barring removal waivers as a registration condition, it likely gave significant weight to the idea that "whether a foreign corporation does or does not remove could
make a dispositive difference in the state's assessment of whether state interests are advanced
or impeded by allowing that corporation in").
355 Diego A. Zambrano, The States' Interest in FederalProcedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805,
1887 (2018) ("[S]tates have a right to be concerned about the boundaries of federalism in the
context of procedure. A robust view of the states' role would improve federal procedure because of the states' wealth of litigation information, democratic bona fides, and unique twosided view of federal litigation.").
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result, plaintiffs confront insurmountable obstacles in some situations in
finding an effective forum to vindicate their rights. Registration-based jurisdictional consent can substantially assist in filling such gaps.
Registration-based consent to jurisdiction has a long pedigree. It dates
back to the years before the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification-that is,
the very beginning of the constitutional protections for personal jurisdiction.
For much of its history, however, registration-based jurisdictional consent
languished in obscurity, as "continuous and systematic" general jurisdiction
overshadowed the doctrine. As a result, it is not entirely clear where the
doctrine stands in modern practice, and some have alleged that the Supreme
Court's recent decisions have rendered it inoperable.
Given this state of affairs, we propose that instead of litigating the
ongoing validity of longstanding statutes, states adopt a modernized jurisdictional-consent statute that works in tandem with other constitutional protections. We believe the Uniform Law Commission is especially well situated
to put forth such a statute, and that states would benefit from adopting it.
Such a statute would avoid the wasteful expense of litigating the interpretation of registration statutes initially adopted during the heyday of the horse
and buggy. More importantly, the proposed Act would allow the states to
assert their sovereign authority to ensure access to justice for their residents
after the demise of general jurisdiction. By precisely tailoring the statute to
the state's sovereign interests, the proposed Act avoids constitutional pitfalls
while still providing an effective jurisdictional reach for the states.

